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<<>><<>><<>>_____TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER...ISSN:--1386-6265____<<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>><<>>______Volume:97-1:32--8-August-1997____<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>________Editor/Manager: Mehmet Tutuncu______<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>______Business:S.Bogut,H.Savas______________<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>___Features: I. Noyan-Izmirli, Y. Puersuen__<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>>______Associate Editors: A.Baguirov, A. Eren, Z.Kadir___<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>____Editorial Board: Dr.Robert M.Cutler, Dr.M.Gammer____<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>____Prof.dr.P.B.Golden, Dr.Baymirza Hayit,Dr.H.M.Hubey___<>><<>>
<<>><<>>______Dr.H.Kirimli, Dr.T.Kocaoglu, Dr.H.B.Paksoy_________<>><<>>
<<>><<>>______Prof.dr. H. Komatsu, Dr.Nesrin Sariahmetoglu______<<>><<>>
Uze Tengri basmasar asra yer telinmeser, Turk bodun ilining torugin
kem artati, udaci erti. (from 7th. century Orkhon runic inscriptions)
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<<>><<>>_______Archives of the Turkistan Newsletter are at:_____<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>___<http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.htm>_____<<>><<>>
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Editorial:
Dear readers:
Caspian Sea and its natural richdoms are in the centre of World actuality
nowadays.
Important things are going on in Caspian Sea: Azerbaijani President Aliyev
visited United States and has signed four more investment contracts,
Turkmenistan is disputing Azerbaijans rights on caspian oil, US says that
it has no objections on transport of Turkmen Gas via Iran to Turkey. One of
the most important players of the Caspian oil and gas game Iran is watching
and remains silence.
Its views are important, not to say vital for the regions development.
In this issue of Turkistan Newsletter we give in this issue Iranian views
on Caspian Oil. These articles are from "Amu Darya". The Iranian Journal of
Central Asian Studies. vol. 1 nr. 2.
Iran is also a country where big amount of Turks live we give an overview
of Turks of Iran from The yearbook of Iran 1997.
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Contents:
#1. The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea (Jamshid Momtaz)
#2. The Prospects of the Caspian Sea Region in the 21st Century (Ahmad Haji
Hosseini)
#3. Conference announcement Central Asia and the Caucasus: Regional Crises,
Prospects and Solutions (Dec. 22-24, 1997)
#4. Turks of Iran (From Iran Yearbook (1997))
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#1. The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea
Jamshid Momtaz
------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the current juncture, the legal regime of the Caspian Sea is based on
two treaties that were signed between the Soviet Union and Iran. The Treaty
of Friendship dates back to February 21, 1921; and the Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation was inked on March 25, 1940.
Subsequent to the Soviet disintegration in December 31, 1991 and the
mushrooming of new states to the north of the Caspian Sea, and also in the
context of recent technical progresses that have entailed the greater
utilization and exploration of marine resources, the necessity of
completing the Caspian Sea's legal regime and the adaptation of the latter
to new regional circumstances were gradually emphasized by the parties to
the foregoing treaties.
Indubitably, the first effective step in this direction was the gathering
of the Caspian Sea littoral states in Tehran in February 1992. It was on
this occasion that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran put to the
fore a proposal on the formation of the Caspian Sea Cooperation
Organization (CASCO). The proposal was met with great enthusiasm and since
then bi- and multilateral meetings were held between the representatives of
the regional countries who forwarded various plans for the resolution of
existing problems in such areas as shipping, fishing, and the use of
maritime resources.
The meeting of foreign ministers in Almaty in May 15-16, 1995, marked a
turning point in the development of the Caspian Sea's legal regime; for at
that meeting it was decided that the directors of legal departments (in the
foreign ministries of the concerned countries) would be in charge of
developing the prospective regime. The first session of this new
institution was held in Tehran, June 28-29, 1995. There, the attendants
agreed on the agenda and the decision-making process. It seems that the
most outstanding result of that meeting was the collective emphasis on the
necessity of attaining unanimity in the decision-making process. The Tehran
declaration pointed out that the next round of negotiations was to begin
towards the end of September 1995 in Almaty.
Generally speaking, negotiations on the Caspian Sea's legal regime and the
updating of existing regulations revolve around two main axes: the laws of
navigation and the laws governing the utilization of the Sea's resources.
1- Navigation Laws in the Caspian Sea
As regards the issue of navigation, the Russian Federation calls for the
establishment of the provisions of the 1921 and 1940 treaties. However, the
rest of the littoral states demand the completion of these regulations with
a view to offering greater security to the littoral states.
Rules Deriving from the 1921 and 1940 Treaties
Chapter 11 of the 1921 Treaty repels the provisions of the Turkmenchai
Treaty (22 February 1828) which banned Iran from forming a navy. This
Chapter grants Iran and Russia equal rights to navigation, warships included.
Subsequent to the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, pro-Tsarist elements
were conducting "anti-revolutionary" activities in the region. As such,
Moscow injected certain provisions in the 1921 Treaty with a view to
curtail underground movements. Chapter 7 of the Treaty notes: Should a
third party implant subversive elements in the marine corps of Iran, this
government [Russia's] will have the right to ask the Iranian government for
the dismissal of these individuals [rough translation].
In the aftermath of the enactment of the 1940 Treaty and despite the fact
that the Soviet government did not face any serious threat, the Soviets
initiated an exchange of official letters between their Ambassador and the
Iranian Foreign Minister to the effect that the signatories of the Treaty
agree "to prevent the citizens of third countries employed in their vessels
or ports to serve and/or visit vessels or ports that fall outside their
official areas of duty [rough translation]."
Upon the signing of the 1940 Treaty there were no foreign sailors employed
in the Soviet fleet; therefore, the aforesaid provisions could have only
applied to, or rather applied against, Iran. It bears mention that to
rationalize the content of these letters the Caspian was referred to as the
"Irano-Soviet Sea," implying that no foreign forces were permitted
involvement. Article 13 of the 1940 Treaty draws on this idea to prohibit
the passage of vessels carrying flags other than those of the two
signatories. It seems that the same idea can still be used to prevent the
utilization of the Sea's resources by non-regional states, institutions,
and individuals.
Article 12 deals with the details of the navigation regime. This regime
considers the behavior of the signatories of the Treaty as equal. The
article stipulates that the conditions of admission and passage of ships in
the ports of the two countries would be the same, and an equal amount of
tax would be imposed by both sides. Although the movement of goods or
individuals between the ports of either party fell within their own
respective jurisdiction, the signatories agreed to observe a similar right
for the vessels belonging to the other party. According to the principle of
equality as defined in Article 14, all navigation documents, including
technical documents, would be equally valid on both sides; precluding the
need for the re-examination of the vessels in the ports of the other party.
Guaranteeing the Security of the Littoral State
The 1921 and 1940 Treaties are flawed in two ways. First, no distinction is
made between civilian and military vessels and the freedom of navigation is
all-encompassing without due regard to the type of vessel. Second, this
principle was applicable to all regions of the Sea, notably coastal areas
and harbors. Though, in the past, none of the Soviet ships entered Iranian
ports prior to securing official permission, and generally speaking, they
were careful not to even approach Iranian coastal areas, the free passage
of warships can easily threaten the security and the political independence
of weaker states; especially given the fact that the naval forces of the
Caspian Sea littoral states are not balanced in strength. Some of them,
i.e., Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, lack a naval force altogether.
By resorting to the legal concept of territorial sea and the creation of
such areas in the Caspian Sea, threats emanating from the presence of
warships can be repelled. In this context the traffic of warships should
become subject to the formal authorization of concerned countries. At the
current juncture the countries that have limited naval power are asking for
the expansion of their territorial waters into adjacent areas, i.e., a
width of ten to twenty miles.
The demilitarization of the Caspian Sea and limitation of the weight of
warships emerge as other security measures for countries that have weaker
navies. However, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan
would go along with that.
Finally, a mid-way solution would best suit all littoral states, i.e., the
declaration of the Caspian Sea as a "zone of peace." Under such
circumstances states will commit themselves to both using the Caspian for
peaceful purposes and resort from threatening the territorial integrity and
political independence of other countries. Undoubtedly, the application of
this concept, which was also referred to in the 1982 UN Convention on the
Laws of the Sea, would be minor compared to a the total demilitarization of
the Caspian.
2- Rules Concerning the Utilization of Marine Resources
Upon the signing of the 1921 and 1940 Treaties, marine resources were not
at stake. Therefore these treaties did not improvise for this issue. They
limit themselves to the question of fishing. The discovery of oil reserves
in Baku's coastal areas, their tapping subsequent to WWII, the additional
discovery of oil in Kazakhstan together with the flow of oil consortiums
into the region, all make the emergence of a suitable legal regime more
pressing.
Fishing Rules
Species living in the Caspian Sea are extremely valuable and economically
important. Notwithstanding the traditional activities of Iranian fishermen
along the Iranian coats, the Russian vessels have always monopolized
fishing in the Caspian Sea. It was in this context that in 1921 the
Russians tried to keep this advantage to themselves. Chapter 14 of the 1921
Treaty underscores the significance of fishing to the Russian population
and the Iranian government commits itself to special fishing restrictions.
In this context and in 1927the parties to the Treaty form a fishing firm
specializing in the export of fish and caviar. Though both parties had
equal shares, it was the Soviet party that controlled the administration of
the firm. Hence the refusal of the Iranian government to renew the Treaty
in 1952.
Paragraph 4 of Article 12 in the 1940 Treaty calls for the creation of a
four-mile fishing zone along the borders of each side. In these zones, the
countries would restrict fishing to their respective vessels. In reality,
however, it was the activities of the Iranian fishermen that were
restricted; this was due to a technical lag. The Russians, on the other
hand, extended their activities to other areas of the Caspian Sea. Till
1970 the Russians monopolized the fishing of several of the most precious
species living in the Caspian Sea. It was only after this date that the
Iranian fishermen began to tap these resources.
In order to prevent the extinction of the Caspian Sea's marine resources,
the past three decades were witness to the cooperation of the littoral
states aimed at the regeneration of the marine resources and environmental
protection. Here one can refer to the 1963 Irano-Soviet Agreement on
Economic and Technical Cooperation. Article 1 of this Agreement both
parties commit themselves to rearing sturgeons. Moreover the first session
of "the Irano-Soviet Standing Working Group" was held in January 1974 with
a view to counter environmental pollution in the Caspian Sea. This group
succeeded to devise a working agenda in its later sessions. Subsequent to
the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, both sides signed an
agreement on the "Second Joint Working Session of the Caspian Sea." Both
sides agreed to exchange information on their ecological research findings,
the extent of pollution of waters flowing into the Sea, and the sources of
pollution. An evaluation of the causes of water fluctuation together with
the development of preventive measures were placed on the group's agenda.
Most experts agree, however, that the increase in the sea level has had
positive impacts on fishery, notably the creation of small lakes and gulfs
at the mouths of the rivers.
Presently, the unchecked increase in fishing activities is endangering the
sea's marine species. Considering the fact that sturgeons migrate to the
Caspian and are dependent on the Sea's ecosystem, their preservation will
not take place without the cooperation of all littoral states.
All this has entailed the negotiation of the littoral states on a treaty
improvising for the preservation of the Caspian Sea's living species. The
negotiation is going through its last stages. It seems that most of the
littoral countries seek the expansion of their fishing zones. Fishing
activities must be subjected to special rules including seasonal banning of
fishing activities. The importance of the issue calls for the creation of
an organization incorporating the representatives of the littoral state who
would oversee the implementation of the rules.
Rules Governing the Exploration of Oil and Gas Resources
The Soviet Union began exploring the oil reserves of the Baku region in
1949. These reserves have had considerable yield, amounting to 160,000 bpd.
In 1990, the Soviets entered an agreement with Chevron on the exploration
of the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. The reserves of this field are estimated
at 25 billion barrels. In the past two years Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have
signed treaties with a number of European and American oil companies,
ensuing the protest of the Russian Federation.
The Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations sent a letter to
the UN Secretary General on October 5, 1995, condemning this action. The
Russians maintain that the newly born republics are subject to the
provisions of the 1921 and 1940 Treaties. It seems that the Russian
Federation views these treaties as "border treaties" that exclusively deal
with territorial questions. In this letter, the Russian Federation refers
to the 1921 and 1940 Treaties and notes that the utilization of the marine
resources should be contingent upon a decision arrived at by all littoral
states. It further stresses that the claims of single country can damage
the interests of others and the Caspian marine resources emerge as a
collective and common source of wealth.
It is worth noting that the position of the Russian Federation is now
opposite to what it has been in the past. Then the Soviets used the seabed
resources without any regard whatsoever for the Iranian position. Prior to
the demise of the Soviet Union, the actions of the Soviet government
implied a tacit division of the Caspian Sea. The basis of this division was
an imaginary line that joined the two states at the Astara and Hosseingholi
Ports. Iran viewed this division as illusory.
At the current juncture, the two states of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, both
possessing vast oil reserves, are defending the previous Soviet position.
They desire the division of the seabed on the basis of the international
law of the sea and the provisions thereof as regards the limitation of
marine zones. On the other hand, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and
the Islamic Republic of Iran claim that the resources are common to all
littoral states. They argue that the seabed resources must be explored in
the context of national limits that will be determined during negotiations
and must be approved by all parties. The derived interests must be divided
among the states on such bases as the coastal length, amount of investment,
and the extent of use of these resources in the past. In this context, the
regime governing the use of resources in the international seabed zone can
be adapted from Section 11 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea. These
resources are extremely valuable economically and therefore they will
emerge as a bone of contention in the process of developing a suitable
legal regime for the Caspian Sea.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that unless the interests of all Caspian littoral
countries are secured, the completion of the Caspian Sea's legal regime
will not take place. The resolution of the region's problems and the
optimal utilization of the Sea's resources necessitate the preservation of
peace and tranquillity. Any move towards the destabilization of the region
must be avoided at all cost. Only then can the ongoing negotiations bear
fruit.
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#2. The Prospects of the Caspian Sea Region in the 21st Century
Ahmad Haji Hosseini
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>From a geopolitical perspective, the Caspian Sea region would undoubtedly
rank as the "heartland" of the world, the control of which can easily
translate into raw power. However, the world is entering a whole new stage;
for if control over this body of water could be forcefully exerted, then
the former Soviets qualified for a predominant role by virtue of their
military supremacy. Notwithstanding this perspective, the Caspian Sea
region faces unique problems of its own. These problems can be broadly
divided into political, economic, and security categories. Each category
involves myriad issues, which might be handled through different, and at
times divergent, means. However, it must be noted here that the mere
classification of problems does by no means translate automatically into
solutions. The primordial problem of the region is legal in character -
that is the lack of a legal regime. The totality of economic,
environmental, political, and security issues confronting the Caspian Sea
are but secondary to the legal question.
However, the absence of a legal regime has not impeded the emergence of
cooperation and the peaceful coexistence of the littoral states.
Now-a-days, the old politics of rivalry governing relations throughout the
Cold War have given way to international cooperation. The unilateral
presence of the Soviet Union, which undermined regional peace, security,
and development, has come to an end. And once again, the blue waters of the
Caspian herald peace, tranquillity, and friendship among nations. It goes
without saying that any movement towards the integration of the regional
countries will leave its positive marks on neighboring regions. It might
even go farther to impact the world at large. In these last years of the
twentieth century, cooperation and integration emerge as the best
alternatives nations can opt for.
The surrounding regions of the Caspian Sea are extremely vast, encompassing
a wide variety of cultures and nations that draw upon the wealth of the
Caspian. Thus far, these nations have managed to develop sound levels of
relations. Some of them are undergoing their first years of independence,
traversing the arduous path of nation-building. Yet, they manifest a
considerable degree of potential. It won't be long before they find their
rightful place in the international community, engaging themselves
full-fledgedly in global politics.
The region is going through a sensitive economic period. From a political
perspective, new encounters are being experienced, giving way to newer
imperatives. As far as the international community is concerned, the stakes
are high and the only precondition to meeting national security
considerations is to guard regional peace and security.
The Caspian Sea is of unsurpassed significance to Iran, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Excluding Russia's gas
reserves, the Caspian Sea's gas deposits amount to 57.1 trillion cubic
meters. The region's oil reserves are estimated at 59.2 billion barrels,
ranking third world-wide.
Here, I do not aim to cover the political and economic issues confronting
the region, nor do I wish to put forth any security formula. However, I
intend to raise a critical point about the region's security architecture:
Any decision on the Caspian Sea's security architecture should be made
solely by the representatives of the littoral states and be based on the
premise that all of these states enjoy equal political rights. For
centuries various tribes have coexisted peacefully in this rather limited
region. The proclamation of statehood by a number of these states can in no
way jeopardize this longstanding tradition. In other words, the Caspian has
always been a region of peace and security and it will remain so in the
future.
Despite a plethora of environmental impediments, the nature of political
ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the newly born republics is
positive. Put differently, there is no major problem haunting the region.
No country is seeking to enlarge its sphere of influence. Though
immediately after the Soviet break-up a number of extraregional countries
sought to resurrect their old imperial ambitions, these drives soon
subsided in face of swift regional renitence.
The only worrisome trend is that of the direct and indirect involvement of
extraregional powers whose peculiar "western" perspective vents its own
distinct imperialistic "flavor." The flow of oil companies to the region
attests to this fact. However, the western presence is currently restricted
to the economic arena. The Caspian's resources were a non-issue when the
1921 and 1940 Irano-Soviet treaties were signed. The two countries struck a
tacit agreement on putting the exploration of maritime resources aside. Now
the West is entering the scene by raising that issue. The foregoing
treaties were bilateral and therefore excluded the activities of third
parties. Now, the utilization of the Caspian Sea's resources is being
mentioned while there is no alternative for the current legal regime.
A constellation of negative parameters, i.e., fear of underdevelopment and
the policies of the former Soviet Union in these republics, prompted the
initial hasty rush of these states towards the West. Now the moves seem
more calculated and pragmatic.
With the disintegration of the former Soviet Union the number of the
Caspian Sea littoral states has increased from two to five, a factor that
necessitates the recasting of that sea's legal regime. Naturally, the
question of security will also be improvised for in this new legal
framework. It seems that without a new legal regime the issue of security
will become irrelevant. The UN document distributed on October 6, 1994,
clearly demonstrates that the legal regime governing the Caspian Sea is
derived from the 1921 and 1940 Irano-Soviet treaties, which will remain
valid until new agreements are reached.
Moreover, the members of the CIS, including the newly born republics of
Central Asia and the Caucasus, have signed the December 1991 Almaty
Declaration, committing themselves to the treaties signed by the former
Soviet Union. Should these states uphold their commitment, then no problem
will emerge and the 1921 and 1940 Treaties will remain operative. However,
unilateral policies will invariably undermine regional peace and security.
The division of the Caspian Sea into numerous territorial zones or the
attempt of the littoral states to expand their territorial sovereignty into
the Sea will be both in breach of international regulations and fall short
of securing the collective interests of the Caspian Sea littoral states.
All in all, any kind of security architecture must take into account the
imperative of good neighborly relations between regional countries;
otherwise it will be unrealistic. In case the extraregional countries are
seeking economic benefit by sowing the seeds of suspicion, conflict, and
war, then their schemes will prove unsuccessful.
Here I wish to allude to a number of common principles shared by the
Caspian Sea littoral states, principles that have developed on the basis of
their national interests and multilateral considerations:
1.Environmental considerations should undergird all decisions in the
region, notwithstanding the economic or security contexts in which they are
made. Pervasive neglect of the environmental issues besetting the Aral Sea
has dealt a deadly blow to this otherwise resourceful body of water. The
Caspian can also suffer the same fate. Unilateral moves, even under the
guise of guaranteeing the region's security or the unnecessary patrolling
of the waters, can inflict irreparable environmental damages on this closed
sea. Should the littoral states each attempt to take their security into
their own hands it won't take long before the sea will become ecologically
extinct. Unfortunately, most of the littoral states pursue unilateral
fishing policies. Should each country strive to turn fishing into a source
of national income thelong no one will be able to fish. The Caspian
produces world class caviar and sturgeons are bred therein. For this to
last fishing activities must be regulated. The new laws will undoubtedly
contribute to the economic prosperity of the region and provide for the
dietary requirements of the regional nations alike. 2.The environmental
condition of the Caspian Sea is degrading rapidly. The increasing water
level is damaging coastal areas. Various sources of pollution caused by the
over-concentration of oil-related activities, damage to nature, shipping
and drilling on the sea bed, the deposit of poisonous materials, and even
atmospheric pollution, are all sources of environmental threat. 3.Oil
and/or gas exploration is extremely damaging to the sea's ecosystem. Here
too the littoral states must forego their individual benefits and look at
the issue from a collective perspective. Should they join hands in this
direction, the collective advantages will accrue to far exceed individual
profits. Unilateral moves towards the exploitation of the Caspian Sea's
resources prior to the clarification of the sea's legal status will not
only be environmentally damaging, but will also have serious repercussions
for the involved parties. Some of these activities are blatant violations
of international norms and must be promptly contained. 4.It would seem
logical to concentrate all security-related issues within the context of a
single and common organization supported by all the littoral states. The
Caspian Sea Cooperation Organization provides the most suitable framework.
CASCO can be mandated to safeguard the common interests of the regional
states; as such it can yield the following results:
•Arms race will be contained; •Trafficking will become subject to the
control of multinational forces; •Spending redundancy will be eliminated
since parallel budgets will not be channeled towards the same tasks, and
hence national savings will increase.
5.As mentioned earlier, the most critical issue that must be tackled is
that of the Caspian Sea's legal regime, which must be based on
internationally recognized rules and regulations, and must be the result of
a consensus arrived at by the littoral states. The intervention of the
extraregional powers can only delay this process and endanger peace and
tranquillity in the region. Thus negotiations on the reinstatement of a
suitable legal regime must only involve the regional countries, especially
given the fact that the latter are extremely suspicious of foreign
intervention in their internal affairs. 6.The Caspian Sea is a
demilitarized zone. Even at the peak of rivalries between the NATO and
Warsaw alliances, the Caspian was spared of military involvement. The
military presence of the Soviets was kept at a minimum. Therefore, the
status quo must be sustained at all price. The relations among the regional
states must develop to such an extent as to preserve the demilitarized
status of the Caspian Sea. This fact necessitates the adoption of long-term
and common strategies. The Caspian must not be regarded from a military
angle. Cooperation and collaboration can be far more productive than
rivalry and militarism. 7.Oil and gas transportation plans must take into
consideration the economic and environmental realities of the region. Some
short-sighted plans are stressing the re-routing of pipes through the sea
(i.e., the Caspian) rather than land (i.e., Iran). They not only neglect
geographical factors but also disregard environmental imperatives, thus
threatening the wealth of the sea's resources that benefit humanity at
large. Such plans are neither economical nor environmentally sound. 8.Here
I wish to consider the issue of security from two distinct perspectives.
One perspective stresses resort to force as the ultimate catalyst to
security. It is in this context that nations enter into military alliances
and embark on militarization. This perspective portrays Iran as the heir to
the expansionist policies of the former Soviet Union, inviting the regional
countries to ignite an arms race in face of the illusory threat of Iran.
Undoubtedly, this picture is far from what Iranian policy-makers have in
mind; it is rather supported by those parties or states that seek to
increase their influence in the region. On the other hand, the second
perspective encourages the development of political culture and
confidence-building. By taking concrete steps towards development,
safeguard of national and international norms, familiarization of the
public with the principles of peace and peaceful coexistence, the regional
governments will strengthen their national, regional, and international
legitimacy. Thus the sources of friction and instability can be uprooted.
One can strongly argue in favor of the development of political culture as
a means of preserving security. It is by resorting to this mechanism that
the Caspian region can best guarantee the security of the states. The
declaration of the Caspian Sea as "a region of peace" would fall within
this context. 9.It is also in this very context that the Islamic Republic
of Iran seeks to forge long-term cooperation and common strategies with all
of the Caspian Sea littoral states. The goodwill of non-regional countries
in this direction will be encouraged, provided they refrain from tilting
the region's security balance in their favor. We are positive, however,
that the intervention of extraregional countries will not succeed in
resolving the region's problems. 10.The Caspian Sea littoral states share
many industrial and economic similarities with Russia, Ukraine, and
Belorus. They share similar consumption markets; yet from a transportation
vantage point, they all emphasize Iran's roads and communication networks.
This fact can be realized through a variety of mechanisms. As various
speakers have pointed out the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and
the Caspian Cooperation Organization (CASCO) can in many ways address the
various issues confronting the Caspian region. 11.I am personally convinced
that these two fora will be effective. Should the political leaders and
policy-makers of the Caspian region engage in a constructive dialogue in
this regard, a promising future will await all of us. All issues can as
such be scrutinized from the vantage point of peace and security. 12.At the
end, it seems appropriate to point out that the Caspian - whether construed
as a sea, a semi-closed sea, or a lake - encompasses a vast of body of
riches that can meet the requirements of the region over the short-,
medium-, and long-run. It is only through the expressed goodwill,
cooperation, integration, and collaboration of the littoral states that
optimal results can be gained.
The nations of the world can secure their long-term objectives by
concentrating on common interest. The adoption of specific methods
vis-à-vis various issues might be useful, but at the end, it is the respect
of international rules and norms that will secure the future of next
generations.
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#3.
The Institute for Political and International Studies
Seminars and Conferences
Central Asia and the Caucasus: Regional Crises, Prospects and Solutions
(Dec. 22-24, 1997)
•With the end of the Cold War and subsequent to the Soviet meltdown, the
Central Asian republics were confronted with new sets of challenges and
opportunities. The region's newly found independence is beset by a plethora
of crises. Against this background, this seminar will attempt to explore
the following topics:
•Prospects of Peace in Tajikistan
•Developments in Afghanistan: Impacts on Central Asia
•Qarabakh and Probable Scenarios
•The Future of Chechnya
•Role of Extra-regional Powers in Regional Crises
To send abstracts or ask questions on this specific conference send email
to: <ipis@neda.net>
The deadline for accepting abstracts is September 6, 1997.
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(From Iran Yearbook (1997))
Turks of Iran
National and Ethnic Groups
The official language of Iran is Farsi or, as it is known in the west,
Persian. Farsi is a West Iranian language of the Indo-European family of
languages and is spoken in those parts of Iran where the Fars people,
Persians, dwell, as well as in the Republic of Tajikistan. Tehran, Isfahan,
Fars, Khorassan, Kerman and Yazd are some of the provinces inhabited by the
Persians.
However, 14.9 percent of the population do not know any Farsi at all. The
percentage goes up to 23.5 percent in rural areas, but is only 7.6 percent
in urban regions; 2.9 percent understand Farsi but do not speak it.
There are a number of other national and ethnic groups living in various
parts of Iran. The historical background and anthropological origin of
these groups have been the subject of numerous research works, but
researchers are not unanimous concerning many of the questions posed.
The most important of these groups with specific history, culture, customs,
and language are the Turks, the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Arabs, the
Turkmans and the Lurs.
There are also a number of ethnic minorities, but they have not been given
much anthropological attention for a number of reasons, their small
population and their extensive mixing with other Iranians being only two.
The following is a general outline of the most populous ethnic and national
groups mentioned.
Turks
There are two streams of opinion concerning the origin of Iranian Turks.
The first maintains that they are the descendants of the Turks who either
migrated to Iran in the seventh and eleventh centuries or invaded parts of
Iran at various times. The second holds that they are original inhabitants
of Iran on whom the invaders have imposed their languages throughout
centuries of occupation. The Iranian Turks live mainly in the north-west of
Iran in the Eastern and Western Azerbaijan provinces (capitals Tabriz and
Urumieh respectively), the Zanjan Province up to Qazvin, in and around
Hamedan, Tehran, around Qom and Saveh, Khorassan Province, and are
scattered throughout many other parts of Iran. Some of the central and
southern ethnic groups, the Qashqaies, for example, are Turkish speaking
(see below).
The Turkish, which is spoken in Iran, is associated with the Turkish spoken
in the Caucasus, but it has undergone varying developments in various
regions. The Turkish dialect spoken in both the Azerbaijan Province in Iran
and in the Republic of Azerbaijan is Oghoz, which is the mother tongue of
the Iranian Turks. The Oghoz have two accent groups: the northern and the
southern. The northern accent is spoken in the Azerbaijan Republic. The
southern accent is prevalent in Iran, where the people's language has been
influenced by Farsi. The differences in dialect, and in the culture and
customs in particular, among the Turks in Iran has been largely ignored;
the emphasis is generally placed on the Turkish language as a whole rather
than other characteristics of the Turks in Iran. Several Turkish dynasties
have ruled Iran in the past, including the Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Safavids,
and Qajars.
Turkmans
The Turkmans are an ethnic minority who speak the Turkish language with the
eastern Oghoz accent. The same dialect is spoken in the Republic of
Turkmenistan. They live in the Turkman Sahra and in the Gorgan Plains. The
area is a fertile plain near the Iranian border with the Republic of
Tukmenistan. It extends from the Atrak River in the north, to the Caspian
Sea in the west, Quchan Mountains to the east, and the Gorgan River to the
south.
Iranian Turkmans have been living in Iran since A.D. 550, but they first
began forming tribes from A.D. 750 onwards. They are the descendants of
Central Asian Turks, who retained their ethnic identity during the Mongol
invasion. They were divided among Iran, Russia and Afghanistan in 1885.
Not all the nine Turkman tribes live in Iran. The most important Iranian
Turkman tribes are Kuklans and Yamotes. The Kuklans have six branches, and
live in the central and eastern Turkman Sahra. The Yamotes have two large
clans, the Atabai and Jaafarbai, and live to the west of Turkman Sahra.
There are also smaller tribes to the east of the region in a few villages.
The Turkman population is estimated to be around one million, and their
biggest towns and cities are Gonbad Kavus, which is the center of Turkman
Sahra, Bandar Turkman, Aq-Qala, and Gomishan. The largest group of Turkman
Muslims follow the Hanafi branch of the Sunni school of thought, but some
Turkmans are followers of the Naqshbandieh Sufism.
Nomads
The migrating nomads constitute a community with a way of living distinct
from the urban and rural communities. Two major, related factors prompt
them to migrate to winter and summer territories, depending on seasonal
changes. The first is their livelihood, and the second is the geographical
and climatic conditions they live in.
Historically, however, social and political factors have also been
influential in creating this pattern of living. These have included
political instability, conflicts between local rulers, and heavy tax
collection campaigns of urban rulers at times of financial problems. The
migratory nomads earn their living principally from raising livestock,
although farming and handicraft compliment their main occupation. All other
economic activities fare pale in comparison to these trades.
As a result, this compels them to look for fresh grazing lands. Also, the
very cold winters in some regions of Iran and extremely hot summers in
others force them to move from winter to summer territories and vice versa
to avoid the extreme weather conditions.
Characteristics
Over the centuries, their communal characteristics have taken a shape
rather different from those of the urban and rural communities. According
to the definition, the migrating nomads are: a) dependent on livestock
raising; b) organized in tribal structures with clear patterns of kinship
and relationships; and c) conscious of their tribalism. Furthermore, each
tribe has an established territory, with commonly owned grazing lands, and
a tribal administrative and social organization.
The nomadic tribes are of several major ethnic origins: Turks, Turkmans,
Persians, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs and Baluchis. Hence, they speak a variety of
languages and are spread all over the country. Kurdistan and Yazd are the
only two provinces without nomadic tribes. But some tribes cross through
the latter to reach their winter and summer territories. The Kurdish tribes
are in the Kermanshahan Province.
Census
The second stage of the latest census taken among the migrating nomads,
completed in 1987, showed new results. The total population of nomadic
tribes is 1,152,099. There are 597,774 men and 554,325 women. The total
number of households are 180,223. The number in the smallest nomadic
division, which shall be called the permanent group here for the sake of
definition, is 23,606. A permanent group consists of a number of households
related either by kinship or by marriage.
The total number of tribes is 96, but there are an additional 547
independent clans. Some of these have neither a solid tribal structure nor
a large number of households. Many of these clans are the remnants of old
tribes and clans, which have disintegrated over time or settled in a
particular region.
The first stage of the census taken in 1985 had shown that Kerman and
Hormuzgan Provinces have the highest number of tribes: 28. The largest
number of clans, 295 in all, have their territories in the Seestan &
Baluchistan and in a part of Khorassan Provinces.
The highest number of migrating households are in the Chaharmahal &
Bakhtiyari, Khuzistan and Isfahan Provinces.
Economic Life
As mentioned earlier, the principal economic activity of the nomadic tribes
is livestock raising, with farming alongside it. They therefore produce
milk, edible oil, butter, cheese, yugort, dried whey, wool, etc. Their farm
products are wheat, barley and rice, which they consume themselves.
Handicrafts also bring some needed revenue. The major products, made
principally by women, are hand-woven carpets, rugs, klims, and coarse
blankets. They also collect wild fruits and medicinal herbs for consumption
as well as for selling.
The 1987 phase of the tribal population census indicated the number of
livestock owned by all nomadic tribes throughout Iran as follows: 9,282,846
sheep and lambs, 7,678,755 goats and kids, 185,800 cows and calves, 6,508
buffaloes and 29,690 camels.
The number of animals used for transporting goods or people was 272,329.
Changing Patterns
The changing economic, political and social structures in the twentieth
century have caused certain developments in the related tribal patterns.
Two factors influenced the changes in the economic field. These were
transactions with sedentary urban and rural communities, and the agrarian
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. The reforms undermined the previous
organization of production units. As a result, grazing lands were specified
to families.
The application of more advanced agricultural tools and the changing
organization of farming reduced the importance of the inter-clan family
relations.
The disarming of the nomadic tribes, the increased power of the central
government and its intervention in tribal affairs, the promotion of labor
markets in the regional towns, the rising rate of literacy, the recruitment
by government departments, and the expanding urbanization were all factors
that contributed to the changes in the social structure of nomadic
population. Migration was also modernized by expansion of roads and the
introduction of cars and motorcycles.
Settlement
Forced settlement of nomadic tribes became a concern of the government
under the first Pahlavi king in the 1920s and 1930s. Considering that they
had been a source of opposition to central governments in preceding eras,
it would have been easier to control them if they settled. Attempts to
achieve this were unsuccessful, mainly because they were not accompanied
with corresponding measures to provide for the livelihood of nomads.
More attention has been paid to nomadic tribes since the revolution for two
reasons. The first is their significant role in livestock raising and meat
production, and the second is the issue of their partial settlement in
urban areas. The unfavorable state of grazing lands, the imbroglio
concerning ownership of those lands, and the rising prices of commodities
that nomads have to procure have initiated a certain tendency towards
natural settlement. In the period that elapsed between two tribal censuses
in 1974 and 1985, 94,418 nomadic households have settled — 89,653 in towns.
A clear tribal policy has not developed yet. However, there are two
prevalent opinions. The first one is opposed to a policy for promotion of
settlement due to the political and agricultural factors already referred
to. The second one maintains that the shortages do not allow for the
provision of the necessary services to the nomadic population. The latter
proposes expansion of the industrial livestock breeding on the one hand,
and preparation for settlement of the nomads on the other.
Qashqaie Tribe
The Turkish speaking Qashqaie tribe is the most reputed tribe in southern
Iran. The Qashqaie territory extends from Abadeh and Shahreza in the
Isfahan Province to the Persian Gulf coast.
The tribe comprises numerous clans. The major ones are: Kashkooli, Sheesh
Blocki, Khalaj, Farsi Madan, Safi Khani, Rahimi, Bayat, Darreh Shuyee.
It is believed that the Qashqaies descended from the ancestors of the
Turkish Khalaj clan, who lived between India and Seestan region of Iran,
and then migrated to central and southern Iran. Each clan has a chief, and
there is a general tribal leader who has been appointed in the old days.
The Qashqaie tribe has never played a decisive role in the national
political developments, but it has occasionally been the source of
short-lived troubles for the government.
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