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<<>><<>><<>>_____TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER...ISSN:--1386-6265____<<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>><<>>______Volume:97-1:29--30--July--1997____<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>________Editor/Manager: Mehmet Tutuncu______<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>______Business:S.Bogut,H.Savas______________<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>___Features: I. Noyan-Izmirli, Y. Puersuen__<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>>______Associate Editors: A.Baguirov, A. Eren, Z.Kadir___<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>____Editorial Board: Dr.Robert M.Cutler, Dr.M.Gammer____<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>____Prof.dr.P.B.Golden, Dr.Baymirza Hayit,Dr.H.M.Hubey___<>><<>>
<<>><<>>______Dr.H.Kirimli, Dr.T.Kocaoglu, Dr.H.B.Paksoy_________<>><<>>
<<>><<>>________________________________________________________<<>><<>>
Uze Tengri basmasar asra yer telinmeser, Turk bodun ilining torugin
kem artati, udaci erti. (from 7th. century Orkhon runic inscriptions)
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#1. The West's Irreducible Interests in Central Asia (Robert M. Cutler)
#2. VOA: TURKMENISTAN / AZERBAIJAN OIL DISPUTE
#3. STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS TURKMEN-IRAN-TURKSIH GAS LINE (Turkish Daily
News
30 July 1997)
#4. No Light At The End Of The Pipeline By Paul Goble Washington, 29 July
1997 (RFE/RL)
#5. Kazakhstan: Caspian Sea Rise Threatens Cities, Industries, Oil Fields
(Don Hill RFE/RL)
#6. THE PENSIONERS IN KAZAKHSTAN RAISE THEIR VOICE...(Rifat Kassis, 29 June
1997)
#7. EASTERN TURKESTAN / CHINA
(1) SEPARATISTS FACE FIGHT AGAINST TOP CADRES (South China Morning
Post, 7/30/97)
(2) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / CHINA SUMMIT Voice of America, 7/30/97, by Gil
Butler
#8. KYRGYZ NEWS - 29 JULY 1997, 30 July 1997
#9. Israeli Documentary about the Khazars (Kevin Brook)
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#1. The West's Irreducible Interests in Central Asia (Robert M. Cutler)
From: "Robert M. Cutler" <rmc@panix.com>
To: owner-turkistan-N@turkistan.org
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 22:50:09 +0000
Subject: Contribution to Turkistan-N
In view of the recent diplomatic activity around the visits to
Washington by Presidents Akaev, Shevardnadze, and
Aliev, I thought this item might be of interest. It was
originally published by by the Center for Post-Soviet Studies
(now the Center for Political and Strategic Studies) in its monthly
opinion newsletter _Focus_, vol. 3, no. 11 (November 1996): 1-2.
(The sense of this argument applies also to the Caucasus.)
The West's Irreducible Interests in Central Asia
Robert M. Cutler
<mailto:rmc@panix.com>
<http://www.panix.com/~rmc>
[Full text]
[Introductory Remarks]
With the dismantlement of the inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal now
under way, it is the apparent lack of well defined long-term goals
(apart from "stability") that largely account for Washington's
inability to clarify the nature of its engagement in Central Asia,
leading it to deal with immediate issues (such as the Tajikstan
situation) on a piecemeal basis. There are, however, at least two key
areas of central Asian concern (not counting the burgeoning drug trade
or the Tajikstan civil war) that directly engage "vital" U.S.
interests. These areas are nuclear nonproliferation and energy
security.
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Kazakhstan has not only lived up to its treaty obligations on nuclear
disarmament but also cooperated with Western operations to prevent the
sale of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union to third
countries. In the multilateral sphere, Kazakhstan has taken a series
of steps to organize a Conference on Interactions and
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICBMA), where states will have
the opportunity to discuss problems and organizational mechanisms to
assure security in all domains. Several preparatory meetings have been
held in view of a convocation of the CICBMA. However, but it remains a
puzzle why the U.S. has contented itself with private expressions of
bilateral support, declining an invitation to join the executive
organizing committee of this nascent institution even after that
committee explicitly adopted the implementation of a nuclear
non-proliferation regime in Asia as one of its principal goals a year
ago. Russia and China have begun to take an active part in this
committee, which will set the agenda for upcoming meetings as well as
any institutional structures. If the West does not act before long, it
will risk being shut out of the process. This cannot be to
Washington's advantage.
Energy Security
The potential of the unbridled economic development of transnational
oil and gas projects in the FSU represents an enormous challenge to
the governments (and the publics that they represent) that will carry
the social costs of that economic development. There is already an
evident shortage of water, whether for drinking or for agriculture,
and there is little if any currently uncultivated arable land on which
to raise more food for that exploding population. Developing all these
resources and bringing them smoothly to market could mean stabilizing
global energy balances, making prices more predictable, and reducing
Western dependence on Middle East oil. An average annual growth rate
of 5% would be necessary in the GNP to cope with the demographic
explosion, but GNP is currently declining. Secure and dependable
access to the energy resources in the NIS, along with their balanced
development, is key to the NIS themselves and the West, as well as to
Russia.
In 1995 Russia responded coolly to an American proposal for the
International Energy Agency (IEA) to hold an international diplomatic
conference on the Caspian. The history and composition of the IEA (it
was set up by the G-7 after the 1973-74 embargo) explains in large
part Russia's was suspicions: for the IEA to run that conference would
have been like giving responsibility for managing international
nuclear affairs in the early 1950s to the UN Security Council -- where
the Soviet Union was outnumbered by the Western powers and
diplomatically isolated. Since that American initiative, Kozyrev has
been replaced as Russian Foreign Minister by Primakov, who has greater
personal authority and is less subject to bureaucratic skirmishes.
Perhaps after the November elections it will be a good time to rethink
this proposal and reformulate it along Central Asian lines.
What Is To Be Done
Movement towards cooperation in Central Asia on both nuclear
nonproliferation and energy security has foundered for want of
interest by the great powers outside Asia. For the U.S. actively to
promote multilateralism in Central Asia would afford the countries in
the region a common voice, decreasing Russia's ability to be
arbitrary. At same time, this would not represent a threat to Russia
but indeed encourage Russian involvement and even promote the
cooperative interest of the oil and gas ministries in their struggle
within the Kremlin against other narrower-minded political forces,
providing incentives for compromise because there would be something
in return. As to the Caspian, this should be couched first of all not
in terms of the division of the sea but in terms of the ecological
questions. It is well known that the seabed is rising, but the reasons
are far from clear and at present under scientific study.
Since the beginning of 1996, U.S. foreign policy has turned towards
Uzbekistan as a strategic "pivot" in the geopolitical game. This move
is predicated on the search for a fulcrum over which to "balance"
against Russia in Central Asia, in order to prevent states there from
"bandwagoning" with Russia. This strategy overlooks the promotion of
autonomous Central Asian cooperation as a means to guarantee regional
security and keep the area out of competing Russian and Chinese
spheres of influence. The recent U.S. strategy of favoring Uzbekistan
has already yielded a mild short-term dividend, when Uzbekistan
blocked a declaration by the Commonwealth of Independent States that
would have opposed NATO expansion. However, the much more important
circum-Caspian issues cannot be satisfactorily solved by traditional
unilateralist diplomacy, because the above analysis shows how in the
Caspian region unilateralism in energy questions yields Russian
predominance.[1]
Conclusion
Since these issues reach far beyond Central Asia, it may be proper to
move towards an entirely new international forum. The point is that
Washington has no choice but to sit at the table for the next deal.
There isn't even a choice about putting in the ante. The problem is
that a preoccupation with the other players prevents the U.S. from
dispassionately evaluating its own hand on its own terms. It seems
forgotten that no one can get up and leave the room. Washington has to
think seriously about playing the hand instead of watching everyone
pass on every round. It's a table-stakes game, and the Central Asians
will just go bust if there's no action; and it isn't the West that
will get their chips.
1. [Note by _Focus_ editor: As at the mid-November meeting in Ashgabat
where the Russian, Turkmenistani and Iranian foreign ministers decided
to form a joint company to produce oil in the Caspian Sea (_Nezavisimaya
gazeta_, 13 November 1996, p. 1). This article was finished October 24,
1996.]
-- | (Dr.) Robert M. Cutler, Fellow, Russian Institute, Carleton University | Postal address: Succursale "H", C.P. 518, Montreal, Canada H3G 2L5 | Phone: +1(514)939-2769 Fax: +1(514)932-4457 | Website URL: http://www.panix.com/~rmc Email: rmc@panix.com<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>
#2. TURKMENISTAN / AZERBAIJAN OIL DISPUTE
BYLINE=HASAN JAVADI DATELINE=WASHINGTON CONTENT= NOT VOICED:
INTRO: AN AGREEMENT SIGNED BY RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN TO EXTRACT OIL FROM THE CASPIAN SEA HAS AROUSED STRONG OPPOSITION FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY BORDERING THE CASPIAN, TURKMENISTAN. VOA'S HASAN JAVADI HAS PREPARED THIS REPORT ON THE LATEST DISPUTE OVER RIGHTS TO EXPLOIT THE RESOURCES OF THE CASPIAN SEA.
TEXT: DURING THE SOVIET ERA, THE RICH OIL FIELDS OF THE CASPIAN SEA HAD MOSTLY RUSSIAN NAMES AND WERE UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL. THE DIFFERENT COASTAL REPUBLICS DIDN'T DISPUTE THE RIGHTS TO THEM. BUT WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE DISPUTES STARTED. THE LATEST CONTROVERSY CONCERNS PLANS TO DEVELOP THE KYAPAZ FIELD OFF THE COAST OF AZERBAIJAN. TWO RUSSIAN COMPANIES, LUKOIL AND ROSSNEFT, ARE INVOLVED IN THE DEAL, AND THE AMERICAN COMPANY UNOCAL ALSO WANTS TO PARTICIPATE. TURKMENISTAN CLAIMS OWNERSHIP OF THE FIELD AND SAYS THE DEAL IS ILLEGAL.
THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT AZERBAIJAN HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR DEALS IT HAS MADE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN OIL. IN SEPTEMBER 1994, WHEN AZERBAIJAN SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH A CONSORTIUM OF WESTERN OIL COMPANIES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THREE OFFSHORE OIL FIELDS IN THE CASPIAN SEA -- THE CHIRAG, AZERI, AND GUNESHLI. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT AND QUESTIONED WHETHER AZERBAIJAN HAD THE RIGHT TO SIGN IT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED LEGAL RULING ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THE CASPIAN FIELDS. TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN SIDED RUSSIA.
ALTHOUGH TURKMENISTAN CALLED FOR RESTRAINT IN PROCEEDING WITH EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE FIELDS, THE DEVELOPMENT IS TAKING PLACE. LATER THIS YEAR THE EARLY OIL (FIRST OIL) WILL START BEING PUMPED FROM THE FIELDS.
IN THE LATEST DISPUTE, OVER THE KAYPAZ FIELD, TURKMENISTAN HAS TAKEN LEGAL ACTION AGAINST AZERBAIJAN. EARLIER THIS MONTH (JULY 4), TURKMENISTAN HIRED A WASHINGTON-BASED LAW FIRM (HOGAN AND HARTSON) TO PURSUE ITS CLAIMS AGAINST AZERBAIJAN OVER THE EXPLOITATION OF THE KYAPAZ FIELD.
AT THE CENTER OF THE DISPUTE IS THE STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA. IRAN, RUSSIA AND TURKMENISTAN SAY THE CASPIAN SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A LAKE; SUCH A CLASSIFICATION WOULD MEAN THAT ALL COUNTRIES BORDERING THE CASPIAN WOULD HAVE TO SHARE ITS RESOURCES. BUT IF IT CLASSIFIED AS A SEA, AS AZERBAIJAN AND KAZAKHSTAN WANT, EACH STATE BORDERING THE CASPIAN WOULD HAVE EXCLUSIVE COASTAL ZONES.
LAST NOVEMBER, AT AN OIL CONFERENCE IN ASHKABABD, RUSSIA PROPOSED THAT THE LITTORAL STATES CLAIM TO A POINT IN THE CASPIAN SEA AND THE MIDDLE SECTION WOULD BE SHARED COLLECTIVELY. EVEN KAZAKHSTAN WENT ALONG WITH THIS PROPOSAL. BUT THE DECISION HAD TO BE UNANIMOUS, AND AZERBAIJAN DID NOT AGREE TO IT. THE FIELDS, ROUGHLY IN THE CENTER OF THE CASPIAN, ARE MOSTLY UNDER AZERI CONTROL.
AZERBAIJANI OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION IF TURKMENISTAN PARTICIPATES IN EXPLOITATION OF KYAPAZ OIL FIELD. BUT TURKMEN AUTHORITIES HAVE SO FAR REJECTED THIS OFFER, SAYING THEY WANT TO ESTABLISH THEIR CLAIM AND CLARIFY THE DIVISIONS AT THE CASPIAN SEA.
AZERBAIJAN'S PRESIDENT, HAYDER ALIEV, IS NOW IN WASHINGTON TO TALK WITH U-S OFFICALS. ON THE EVE OF HIS STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, HE DISCUSSED HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION REGARDING THE CASPIAN AND THE RECENT AGREEMENTS. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE KYAPAZ DEAL HAS THE SUPPORT OF RUSSIA:
/// ALIEYEV ACT ///
IN OUR TRIP TO MOSCOW, AT THE SUGGESTION OF RUSSIA, WE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH TWO RUSSIAN COMPANIES FOR KYAPAZ OIL FIELD AND THIS HAS ANGERED TURKMENISTAN. IT IS TRUE THAT THIS FIELD IS ON THE BORDERLINE BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND TURKMENISTAN AND IT USED TO BE CALLED 'MIDDLE FIELD'. THIS HAS NOT BEEN BY OUR INITIATIVE. BOTH LUKOIL AND ROSSNEFT ARE INTERESTED IN THIS FIELD AND WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH TURKMENISTAN, SO THERE IS NO NEED FOR TURKMEN AUTHORITIES TO BE UPSET.
/// END ACT ///
THE RUSSIANS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE CLAIMS OF TURKMENISTAN. RUSSIAN ENERGY MINISTER SERGY KIRIYENKO HAS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AZERBAIJAN, RUSSIA AND TURKMENISTAN WILL ACHIEVE A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE CASPIAN OIL AND GAS FIELDS. A RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS DESCRIBED THE KYAPAZ AGREEMENT AS PURELY COMMERCIAL, A DEAL CONCLUDED BY PRIVATE COMPANIES OF RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN. HE ADDED THAT "PRIVATE RUSSIAN COMPANIES ENJOY CONSIDERABLE FREEDOM OF ACTION, WHICH DOES NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE WITH MOSCOW'S OFFICIAL POSITION.
DAVID NISSMAN, AN ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, SAYS RUSSIA HAS BEEN VERY FLEXIBLE IN ITS POSITION REGARDING THE CASPIAN:
/// NISSMAN ACT ///
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, ON ONE HAND MAINTAINED THAT THE CASPIAN IS A LAKE THEREBY IT HAS TO BE REDIVIDED; ON THE OTHER HAND, IT HAS MADE NO STEPS WHATSOEVER TO INTERFERE IN THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS MADE BETWEEN RUSSIAN COMPANIES AND THOSE COMPANIES, LET US SAY SOCAR (STATE OIL COMPANY OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC) OR KAZAKH OIL. RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS POLICY ACCEPTS THE STATUS QUO, THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE CASPIAN, WHEREBY IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL BODY OF WATER, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT THE QUESTION HAS YET TO BE CLARIFIED.
/// END ACT ///
WHEN IT COMES TO OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS IN THE REGION, TURKMENISTAN HAS THE MOST AFTER KAZAKHSTAN, BUT IT HAS NOT DEVELOPED THEM LIKE AZERBAIJAN, WHICH TAKES THE THIRD PLACE AMONGST THE OIL RICH CASPIAN STATES.
TURKMENISTAN HAS RECENTLY STEPPED UP ITS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE WESTERN COMPANIES TO EXPLOIT ITS GAS AND OIL RESOURCES, BUT MR. NISSMAN SAYS TURKMENISTAN'S ECONOMY IS NOT AS ADVANCED AS ITS NEIGHBORS:
/// NISSMAN ACT ///
SOMETHING HAS TO BE BORNE IN MIND, WHEREAS AZERBAIJAN AND KAZAKHSTAN HAVE BEEN MAKING AN EFFORT TO BRING THEIR ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UP TO FREE MARKET STANDARDS AND THIS INCLUDES VERY MUCH THE OIL BUSINESS, TURKMENISTAN HAS NOT DONE THIS. TURKMENISTAN, IN TERMS OF ACQUIRING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, HAS BEEN LAGGING BEHIND THE OTHER COUNTRIES, BECAUSE THEY STILL DON'T HAVE THE ECONOMIC BASIS, OR EVEN ECONOMIC STABILITY TO COMPETE WITH THE OTHER THREE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.
/// END ACT ///
TURKMENISTAN HAS WARNED IT WILL NOT BACK DOWN IN OPPOSING THE CASPIAN OIL DEAL SIGNED BY RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN. ON MONDAY TURKMEN PRESIDENT SAPAMURAT NIYAZOV MET (IN ASHGABAT) WITH A RUSSIAN DELEGATION HEADED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER VALERY SEROV TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE KYAPZ OIL FIELD. (SIGNED)
30-Jul-97 12:51 PM EDT (1651 UTC) Source: Voice of America
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#3. STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS TURKMEN-IRAN-TURKSIH GAS LINE
Turkish military is claimed to be against Iran route
UGUR AKINCI Washington - Turkish Daily News, 30 July 1997
The U.S. State Department reconfirmed on Monday what has been made explicit by the White House over the weekend: The U.S. supports the gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Turkey, even though it crosses through Iran.
Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Alan Larsen testified before a Congressional committee that the pipeline's Iranian itinerary did not violate the ILSA (Iran Libya Sanctions Law) which prohibited any third party from investing over $40 million in Iran's and Libya's petrochemical industries. Turkish state pipeline company BOTAS, which is involved in the gas pipeline in question, will not come under ILSA scope, Larsen state.
Deputy spokesman for the State Department, Jim Foley, said on Monday that Turkey was going to receive Turkmen, not Iranian, gas in accordance with the Turkish-Turkmen agreement signed in May 1997.
Iran policy remains the same
But that did not mean that the administration was mellowing towards Iran, Foley said. There has been no change in U.S. policy in any way nor any signal to that effect," he emphasized. "It is U.S. policy and law to seek to deny Iran the resources it needs to pursue terrorism and weapons of mass destruction by means of deterring investments in Iran's oil and gas sectors. We are applying that law diligently."
Last week, 222 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, including 10 committee chairmen, signed a statement reaffirming the need to continue to isolate the Iranian regime.
"The bottom line" is that Turkey is going to buy gas from Turkmenistan, not Iran, Foley said.
Pipeline not ready yet
Currently, the natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Tehran is just about to be completed, an insider source told TDN. The line from Tehran to Tabriz also exists. But the connection from Tabriz to the Iran-Turkish border does not exist yet, the source said. Iran, which reportedly also built the line inside Turkmenistan in exchange for gas, is expected to complete the Tabriz-Turkish Border line in late 1998.
Keep fees low
Concerning the uneasy issue of the transit fees that Iran would be earning from the pipeline, Foley said "We believe that Turkey and Turkmenistan have an interest" in seeing that the fees are "low and in alignment with market circumstances."
He said the U.S. position also reflects the desire to encourage emerging countries to develop their natural resources and to help Turkey, "an old and loyal NATO ally."
Not ideal route
Foley also noted that the United States believes that the route through Iran is "not the ideal route" to bring Turkmenistan's natural gas to the West. "We preferred a trans-Caspian route" that could also serve to develop Azerbaijan gas resources, he said.
Turkish military agrees?
According to an insider TDN source who asked to remain anonymous, the Turkish military is also not comfortable at all with a pipeline that would be passing through Iran and, as an option, wants to see a trans-Caspian underwater line instead.
The main reason for military's opposition is said to be the support Iran gives to the PKK and Iran's determination to export the Islamic revolution to Turkey, the source said. In early 1997 the Iranian ambassador to Ankara created a storm by openly defending Shariat as a regime fit for Turks. As a result he had to be recalled to Iran.
A second alternative that the Turkish military favors is the use of an existing natural gas pipeline that detours from north of the Caspian Sea and extends all the way down to Georgia. With an extension from Georgia, Turkey could still get Turkmen gas even if it would be more expensive to do so that way, is how the TDN source summarized the Turkish General Staff's alleged preferences.
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#4. No Light At The End Of The Pipeline
By Paul Goble
Washington, 29 July 1997 (RFE/RL) - Washington's decision not to oppose Western involvement in an Iranian pipeline project fundamentally changes the geopolitical situation in Eurasia even if it is unlikely to lead to a new outflow of natural gas anytime soon.
Over the weekend, American officials said that the United States had concluded that it has no legal basis for objecting to Western participation in the development of a pipeline system to carry Turkmenistan natural gas across Iran to Turkey.
These officials argued that the principle beneficiaries of this pipeline would be Turkmenistan and Turkey rather than Iran. And therefore, a White House spokeswoman said, this decision in no way represents "a change in policy or any signal regarding that policy."
But despite such denials, that step is likely to be seen across the region as a major shift away from an American policy of seeking to isolate Iran, long identified as a sponsor of international terrorism, by imposing sanctions on any firm doing business there.
And that perception in itself will have a significant, if sometimes contradictory impact on Iran, Iran's relations with its neighbors, and on Russian relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia and with the United States.
For Iran, this American decision represents both an important concession from its chief opponent on the international scene and an equally strong stimulus to continue the more moderate path it has pursued since presidential elections last spring.
The American decision, while explicitly limited to the current case, will inevitably create expectations that Washington will become even more forthcoming and will limit still further the American effort to keep the Europeans in line on the issue of isolating Iran.
And if such expectations lead Iranian leaders to move toward a more moderate course, this decision could prefigure a fundamental change in relations between Iran and the rest of the world on a broad range of issues.
Even more significant than its likely impact on the Iranians themselves is the effect this decision is certain to have on Iran's relationships with other countries in the region.
Few countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, or the Caucasus have been willing to follow Tehran's ideological lead, but all the countries in these regions have wanted to maintain good relations with Iran both because of its size and its location.
Many of them have felt constrained in pursuing such ties by the vehemence of American opposition to the Iranian authorities. And consequently, the latest American decision is likely to encourage some to step up their efforts in this direction.
But perhaps the most important consequence of this decision is likely to be the impact it will have on Moscow's ability to maintain its influence on the former Soviet republics that are now independent countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Many experts have pointed out that these eight countries would be far more independent of Moscow today than they are had they been able to export across Iran. But the radicalism of the Iranian authorities and American opposition to it limited their ability to do so.
Thus, American efforts to isolate Tehran, unintentionally had the effect of blocking efforts by these countries to pursue a more independent line.
That served Moscow's geopolitical purposes and also helped explain why the Russians have provided, over repeated American objections, military and even nuclear technology to the Iranian authorities.
Consequently, this shift in American policy, reflecting a U.S. desire to gain access to the enormous oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea basin, may appear to some in Moscow to be something very different, a direct challenge to Russian geopolitical interests.
And past and present Russian aid to Tehran may give Moscow the leverage in Iran to block the flow of Central Asian or Caucasian oil and gas across that country to the West. But any Russian efforts in this direction are likely to exacerbate divisions within the Iranian leadership.
Iranian radicals who will see the construction of such a pipeline and any further rapprochement with the West as a threat to their vision of the future may agree with the Russians.
Such conclusions might thus presage a number of shifts in the road and the pipeline before any gas actually comes across Iran to the West.
29-07-97
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#5. Kazakhstan: Caspian Sea Rise Threatens Cities, Industries, Oil Fields
By Don Hill
Almaty, Kazakhstan; 18 July 1997 (RFE/RL) -- Little understood forces are making the world's largest inland sea even larger, threatening an environmental and economic catastrophe measured in the thousands of millions of dollars.
The Caspian Sea lies east of the Caucasus Mountains and, sprawling over a territory larger than Germany, dominates the endless plains of western Central Asia. It's bordered on the north and west by Russia, on the west by Azerbaijan, on the south and west by Iran, and on the east by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
It long has been famed as a source, now dwindling, of a large share of the world's supply of fine caviar. But since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Caspian has come increasingly to the world's attention as a source for another form of black gold -- oil.
Sukru Bogut, a Turkish-educated mining engineer and geologist, vice president in New Orleans of Drilling Measurements, Inc., a petroleum industry service company, recently published Caspian Oil Perspectives, a research paper. He quotes press reports of possible oil reserves in the Caspian basin of 178,000 million barrels. If that promise were realized, the Caspian's oil wealth would fall between Iraq's known 100,000 million barrels and Saudi Arabia's 261,000 million.
This buried wealth takes the rise of the Caspian Sea out of the realm of local nightmare to that of international crisis. But for more than five years, the nations of the world, including those on the Caspian shores, have met the problem with kiloliters of talk and cc's of action.
A recent 92-page special report on the Caspian Sea published by Focus Central Asia in Almaty, Kazakhstan, reviews the modern natural history of the Caspian. For most of the century before 1930, the sea was stable, averaging 25.8 meters below sea level. But then it started a long drop,and reached 29 meters below sea level in 1977. The drop exposed expanses of seabed. Agriculture, homes, and industry followed the receding sea to remain close to the shoreline.
The Focus Central Asia report describes one official reaction this way: "Heroic projects were conceived to reverse the flows of several Russian rivers which empty to the north." The report says: "Fortunately, the largest part of these plans remained on paper. The exception was a solitary project completed in Turkmenia in 1980 (in which) Kara-Bogaz-Gol Bay was closed off by a dam. Later it became necessary to blow up this dam. The water rose with such speed that it created entirely new problems."
Beginning in 1978, the Caspian Sea has been rising -- three meters in 19 years. The shoreline has moved by more than 20 kilometers. Nobody knows for sure why.
One theory is that the cause is tectonic, that underground stresses affect the flow of water from the natural springs that, along with rivers and direct precipitation, feed the sea. This theory holds that the same forces that are inundating the lands on the Caspian shore may be contributing to the disastrous shrinking of the much smaller Aral Sea, several hundred kilometers to the east.
But the dominant theory is that the changes are climactic, a chaotic and unpredictable mix of cloud cover, air temperature, precipitation, and human activity. In any case, most predictions are that the water level will rise another meter by the year 2010.
Historically, rises in the Caspian Sea level were inconveniences, not disasters, to the predominantly nomadic Central Asians. As one Kazakhi put it: "People just rolled up their yurts (sheepswool tents) and went somewhere else." In modern times of highrises and fixed homes, multimillion-dollar agriculture, and oil installations and other technology.
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#6. THE PENSIONERS IN KAZAKHSTAN RAISE THEIR VOICE... THE LEADER WAS JAILED AND THE MAYOR WAS FIRED
On the morning of June 8th, the National Television of Kazakstan reported that Irina A. Savostina, the head of the pensioners movement "Generation" and one of our partners in Kazakstan, was sentenced to five days detention.
A few weeks ago when it was announced that the Government approved a double fold increase in charges for municipal services, there was an act of protest on the Square in front of the Kazakh Parliament building. Savostina had obviously been one of the active participants of it.
Government officials justified the arrest by saying that Mrs. Savostina, pensioners from "Generation", and a working class movement were involved in an unauthorized act of protest" (people refused in public to pay their bills).
According to information received from Kazakh-American Bureau on Human Rights, law enforcement bodies instituted proceedings against the initiators of the rally because of their alleged calls for "forcible change of the existing state regime", which was assessed as political persecution.
After the demonstration, the Mayor of Almaty was fired.
Pensioners might not live long enough to get pensions. Pension reforms have started in Kazakstan. Every citizen is entitled to choose a pension accrual fund to allocate 10% of his or her wages. The official pension age is changing all the time and at the moment is 63 for men and 58 for women. In the future it will increase by two years. At the same time, however, average life expectancy for men in Kazakstan is 59 years.
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#7. EASTERN TURKESTAN / CHINA
From: THE WORLD UYGHUR NETWORK NEWS (An electronic newsletter) Date: July 30, 1997 From: Abdulrakhim Aitbayev (rakhim@lochbrandy.mines.edu)
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(1) SEPARATISTS FACE FIGHT AGAINST TOP CADRES South China Morning Post, 7/30/97, by WILLY WO-LAP LAM
President Jiang Zemin has vowed to send more "skilful and accomplished" cadres to Xinjiang and Tibet to tame separatist movements.
The reshuffle of regional cadres is a key topic in the continuing leadership meetings at the Beidaihe resort. A mainland source said Mr Jiang had paid particular attention to personnel matters in areas with concentrations
of ethnic minorities, such as the autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia.
"We must transfer to autonomous regions cadres with a high level of awareness of Marxist principles," the party chief reportedly said in a recent speech.
"They must have proven political skills and experience in handling ethnic problems."
The source said Beijing was considering appointing heavyweight politicians to be party secretaries of the regions.
The party boss of Tibet, Chen Kuiyuan, has been in office since 1992 and his counterpart in Xinjiang, Wang Lequan, since last year.
"Because of lack of positions, it is not possible for the leadership to reserve one or more Politburo seats for a representative from ethnic regions," another source said.
"But newly appointed cadres to these areas will have more power than before in mobilising resources to crack down on separatists."
He said previous party bosses of autonomous regions had included high-fliers like Hu Jintao, the youngest member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
In his recent speech, Mr Jiang said Xinjiang posed the biggest threat to his administration and national unity.
The President attributed this to "infiltration" and support from hostile forces, such as Uygur nationalist bases in a few former Soviet states like Kazakhstan.
In contrast, Mr Jiang expressed satisfaction that the situation in Tibet had been brought under control, partly due to Beijing's improved relations with neighbouring countries such as Nepal and India.
He also indicated the fast-improving standard of living in Inner Mongolia had helped calm the separatist movement there.
Western diplomats have said recent rioting in Xinjiang was partly a result of the low quality of Han and Uygur cadres stationed in the region.
Many senior party officials have been suspected of corruption and mismanagement.
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(2) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / CHINA SUMMIT Voice of America, 7/30/97, by Gil Butler
INTRO: The Washington-based organization, Human Rights Watch, has called on President Clinton to delay scheduling a summit meeting with China's president until Beijing improves its human rights practices. VOA's Gil Butler has more on that development from the Chinese capital.
TEXT: For China, the summit meeting in Washington between president Jiang Zemin and President Bill Clinton is an extremely important event. Though Mr. Clinton and President Jiang have talked at other international meetings, this is the first time the Chinese leader will have been given head-of-state honors in the United States. It is regarded here as proof that sino-american relations are on the right track.
But there is another view of the summit. Human Rights Watch sent an announcement to news organizations in Beijing saying the Clinton administration should avoid setting a firm date for a summit meeting with Jiang Zemin until Beijing takes steps to improve what human rights watch describes as, "Its dismal human rights performance."
An official with Human Rights Watch/Asia said the Clinton administration would welcome token prisoner releases or other gestures -- but, it says, the administration is not willing to threaten to cancel the summit if there is no real human rights progress.
// opt // The Human Rights Watch official says the Clinton administration risks throwing away the enormous leverage of a summit meeting. Human Rights Watch says its call for a delay in scheduling the summit was in response to reports that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had discussed the summit with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen and the probable summit date was given as the 28th of October. // end opt //
The organization says resuming a formal dialogue on human rights or releasing a few dissidents is not sufficient. It says there should be no White House meeting until Beijing takes significant steps. Human Rights Watch listed such steps as: allowing access to Tibet and Xinjiang province by human rights monitors, reforming the state security law, allowing access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations, signing two UN human rights conventions, releasing large numbers of Chinese and Tibetan prisoners and protecting basic civil liberties in Hong Kong.
The Chinese foreign ministry has had no reaction so far to the Human Rights Watch call for a delay in the summit.
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#8. KYRGYZ NEWS - 29 JULY 1997
1. Human Rights Committee of Kyrgyzstan announced in Bishkek today that procurator office of the Bishkek city and Dastan Sarygulov, president of the State gold company, had appealed to the Supreme Court, demanding to overturn the decision, taken by the city court on 10 June, and restore the original verdict.
Sarygulov brought an action against 4 journalists with the independent Res Publica weekly, accusing them of libeling and insulting him in the articles, published in 1993-1996. On 23 May, district court sentenced two journalists (chief editor Zamira Sydykova and correspondent Aleksandr Alyanchikov) to 18 months of imprisonment and two others (editors Marina Sivasheva and Bektash Shamshiev) were barred from engaging in journalism for 18 months. Municipal court changed the decision on 10 June: Sydykova was sentenced to 18 months of colony serving, Alyanchikov was sentenced to 18 months of suspended imprisonment. Sivasheva and Shamshiev were acquitted.
Sydykova was forced to live in the colony hostel without any facilities and has been hospitalized recently.
KYRGYZ NEWS - 30 JULY 1997
President Askar Akayev held a meeting of the Security Council in Bishkek on 29 July. 4 items were on the agenda: 1. Ecological security, 2. Visa regime in the country, 3. Economical security of the country, 4. Implementation of the decisions of the Council from 12 September, 1996.
Activity of the Ministry of ecology on ensuring the ecological security of the country was found unsatisfacory. According to the Council's decision on it, only 30% of country territory is available for living and only 20% of that 30% has ecologivally favourable conditions. Ministry received a task to work out a state program on ensuring the ecological security. The program will be for the period of 1998-2005.
Interior ministry suggested to change the visa regime with some countries. According to its information, 14,505 foreigners visited Kyrgyzstan in 1996 officially, but the real figure is about 2 times more, because citizens from some countries (especially CIS-countries) need no visa to come to Kyrgyzstan. Most of them visit Kyrgyzstan without any registration.
79% of registered foreign visitors were from China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 362 cases of law violations were committed by foreigners in 1996. Security Council gave a task to the Interior ministry to work out measures to register all foreigners.
Discussion on the 3rd and 4th subjects were postoned till next meeting in the fall. At the meeting of the Security Council on 12 September, 1996, 6 top officials, including two governors of the regions and director of the State Custom service, were accused of corruption and were dismissed from their posts. Council suggested Procurator General office to bring legal actions against them, but no lawsuit has been opened.
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#9. Israeli Documentary about the Khazars
>From Khazaria Home Page: <http://www.khazaria.com>
------------------------------------------------------------------------ >From March 17 to 19, 1997, Israeli Television Channel 1 broadcast a 3-part series in Hebrew about the Khazar kingdom. It was narrated by Ehud Ya'ari, a well-known Middle East Affairs news correspondent for the Israeli media. The chief researcher for this project is Michael Goldelman, a Russian Jew from Moscow who immigrated to Israel a few years ago. The program generated widespread interest in Khazars among both Israeli scholars and the general public.
Mr. Ya'ari's research team did extensive explorations of Khazar history by reviewing both the historical documentation and the surviving artifacts from the Khazar realm. Below is a summary of the 3 parts of their documentary:
PART 1: THE KHAZARS IN CRIMEA The research team travelled to the Crimea to discover what artifacts remain from the Jewish steppe-empire and to ascertain whether the Karaites and Krymchaks who still live there are descended from the Khazars. Several Karaites are interviewed, and old documents and Torah scrolls are presented. The video also shows the Karaite graveyard and house of worship at Chufut-Kale, plus Jewish Khazar sites in Cherson and Sudak. In Cambridge University's library, Ehud Ya'ari read portions of the Reply of King Joseph to Hasdai ibn-Shaprut as well as a segment from the Schechter Letter. In Saint Petersburg, Russia, the video shows a copy of mysterious Khazar legends recorded by Avraham of Kerch. Unfortunately, other precious documents were stolen from Saint Petersburg's Hermitage in the 1990s by Israelis. For example, the original copy of the Long Version of Khazar King Joseph's Reply to Hasdai ibn-Shaprut is missing from the library. A 12th-century Torah scroll has also been reported missing.
PART 2: SARKEL AND THE SEARCH FOR ITIL In the 1950s, the great Khazarian fortress of Sarkel was flooded by the Soviets as a result of a dam project. Archival film footage shows the flow of water to fill the dam. Before the deluge, Russian archaeologists such as Mikhail Artamonov and Svetlana Pletnyeva did an extensive survey of the graves and artifacts at Sarkel, and some of these artifacts were brought to the Hermitage Museum. A synagogue may have existed in the center of Sarkel. After an interview with Artamonov's granddaughter and Pletnyeva, the research team searches for the lost Khazar capital city of Itil. A researcher in Astrakhan says he thinks the Volga River changed direction in the years following Itil's demise. A Japanese archaeologist, Hoichi Irokawa, thinks that the walls that surrounded Itil are underwater in Chisti-Banka. However, a rival theory, put forth by archaeologist Yevgenia Schneidstein, contends that Itil is actually located under a hill at Samosdelka. Further excavations need to be conducted to determine whether one of these sites is actually Itil. Part 2 also shows the Turkic runic writing of the Khazars and several Jewish artifacts uncovered in the Khazar territory.
PART 3: THE KHAZARS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS, HUNGARY, AND KIEV In part 3, the research team begins by travelling to multiple places north of the Caucasus Mountains, including Derbent, Agach-kale, and the Khazar cities Balanjar and Samandar. The Kumyks who live in Samandar might be descendants of the Khazars. Murad Magomedov, an expert archaeologist who lives in Daghestan, gives Ehud Ya'ari a guided tour of sites and materials he excavated. Khazar artifacts such as golden earrings, pottery, and wall drawings are shown. Later in the program, Ehud visits a museum in Kiev where some artifacts of possible Khazar origin are housed. Omeljan Pritsak and Norman Golb discuss two documents they translated in their 1982 book Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century: the Kievan Letter and the Schechter Letter. Towards the end of part 3, an old illustrated edition of the Rus'ian Chronicle is shown. The Rus'ian Chronicle contains an entry which discusses the conquest of the Khazars by Prince Svyatoslav of Kievan Rus in the 960s as well as other entries about the Khazars.
A good summary of the film crew's travels is contained in Ehud Ya'ari's article "Skeletons in the Closet" in The Jerusalem Report's September 7, 1995 issue, on pages 26 to 30. The article contains a few misstatements because the author was trying to be "politically correct", but Mr. Ya'ari has changed his views since then and now recognizes the partial descent of Hungarian Jews from the Khazars.
The intellectual climate in Russia is more conducive to objective research now that Stalinist dictates are no longer enforced by the government and printing presses. New evidence is being uncovered yearly, and old evidence is being critically re-examined. Readers of Russian may want to consult Michael Goldelman's article "Evrei v etnicheskoy istorii Xazarii" in Vestnik Evreyskogo Universiteta v Moskve, no. 1(8), 1995, pages 61 to 79, for an overview of recent Russian perspectives on Khazaria's Jewish history. Mr. Goldelman continues to research and write articles about Khazarian history, including a master's degree paper entitled "The Jewish Khazars - Myth or Reality?"
In Washington D.C., Mr. Ya'ari was interviewed by Lynn Neary on National Public Radio (NPR) on the Morning Edition program on April 14, 1997. He confirmed that an English translation of the documentary is in the works, and will be aired on the Discovery Channel or PBS later in 1997. When full details are available on the broadcasting of this series in the United States, they will be posted on this website. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
kbrook@khazaria.com
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************************************************ Mehmet Tutuncu (SOTA) Research centre for Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Caucasus and Siberia P.o. box 9642 2003 LP Haarlem The Netherlands e-mail: <mtutuncu@turkiye.net> or <sota@euronet.nl> Turkish World Home Page:<http://www.turkiye.net/sota/sota.html> Crimean Tatars Home-Page: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html> *******************************
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