In this issue of Turkistan:
1. TURKESTAN (Central Asian) UNION CONFERENCE OPENS IN KYRGYZSTAN. (Naryn
Aiyp)
2. Russia's Future Breakup and Tatarstan's Independence (Sabirzyan
Badretdinbov)
3. Current situation in The Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya
4. Articles of Crimean Tatar Journal Emel on the Web
5. KORA Black Sea and Central Asia Centre in Turkey
6. Book review: Dr. Mehmet Kara: Ata Atacanov'un Shiirleri, Turk Dil Kurumu
Yayinlari 671 Ankara 1997, I. Giris-Metin-Aktarma, 801 p. II.
Inceleme-Gramer Dizini 1006p.
7a. 1997 Wisconsin Workshop on Central Asian Studies
7b. Organizational Meeting Consortium For Central Asian Studies
8. Letters and reactions to the editor
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1. TURKESTAN (Central Asian) UNION CONFERENCE OPENS IN KYRGYZSTAN.
Meeting of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan ended in
Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata today. Nursultan Nazarbayev, Islam Karimov
and Askar Akayev had discussed on 24-25 July the results of cooperation since
1994, when an econonmical union between three countries was formed. Also,
situation in Afghanistan, situation in Tajikistan, formation of the Central
Asian peacekeeping batallion, other questions were discussed. President
Akayev's press service has announced that three presidents supported an
Akayev's idea to hold an international conference on Afghanistan in Bishkek.
Also, 32 multilateral projects were approved by presidents at the meeting and
they have been sent to the governments for implementation.
-Naryn Aiyp-
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2. Russia's Future Breakup and Tatarstan's Independence
by: Sabirzyan Badretdinov
As recently as 1990, most Western analysts failed to foresee even as a
contingency that the Soviet Union would break up into 15 sovereign states.
As a result, the West was caught off guard by the appearance of 3 potential
new nuclear states.
A similar mistake is being repeated now. Very few political analysts realize
that the Russian Federation is in the process of disintegrating. Only a few
Western scholars predict Russia's future breakup: Zbigniew Brzhezinsky, Peter
Reddaway, Paul Goble and Jessica Eve Stern.
If (and when) Russia disintegrates, Tatarstan will inevitably become one of
the new independent states. The following 5 arguments support the view that
Russia is on the verge of breaking up:
1. The breakup of the Soviet/Russian empire is not yet complete.
It has never happened in the entire history of the humankind that an empire
breaks up in one day simply because a treaty was signed. Usually, it takes
years or even decades for that to happen. For example, the mainly Christian
provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Europe achieved independence years before
the Moslem provinces of Asia. It took decades for the Roman Empire to
disintegrate completely.
2. The balance of power in Russia between the center and the regions is
changing in favor of regions.
The constitutions of at least 10 republics -- Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
Buryatia, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Mordovia, Sakha, Tuva and Udmurtia -- declare
primacy of local laws over federal ones. Chechnya has de facto seceded from
Russia. Many regions have already introduced their own coupons or
quasi-currencies. A number of republics were able to extract important
concessions from Moscow. Local authorities are luring away the military
district commanders. Military leaders realize that it is not from the center
that they are getting apartments, kindergartens, and food. And therefore, if
they have to make a choice, they will carry out the orders of the local
authorities. In many republics and regions, the Interior Ministry structure
is already under complete control of local authorities.
3. Economic separatism of ethnically Russian regions is becoming the major
driving force of Russia's disintegration.
Russia is composed of diverse economic regions with differing economic
objectives. Areas rich in exportable natural resources, for example, will be
better off if commodity prices are determined on a market basis, if the ruble
is competitively priced on foreign exchange markets, and if the government
stops subsidizing industry. In contrast, industrial regions favor continued
administrative pricing, over-valued exchange rates, and continued subsidies
for industry. Separatism has more supporters in resource-rich regions, such
as Krasnoyarsk Krai, and fewer supporters in subsidized regions, such as
Altai Krai. Protectionist policies, especially export quotas and
administrative pricing of commodities, could exacerbate the separatist
tendencies in the resource-rich areas. This is especially the case for parts
of Siberia and the Far East, whose most natural trading partners are Pacific
Rim countries. The bitter conflict between President Yeltsin and Governor of
Primorsky Krai Nazdratenko is the most recent example of this tendency.
4. Economic links connecting various regions within Russia are often
completely irrational and, therefore, not sustainable.
For instance, because of a deceision of some bureaucrat in Moscow, oil
extracted in Sakhalin Island in the Far East is transported through 8
time-zones to the European part of Russia for consumption by local industry
instead of being sold to Japan, located next door. The regions must sever
those economic ties that were artificially and arbitrarily established among
them by Moscow, and re-establish them on a more rational basis. This could
be done only if all the decision-making powers are transferred from the
center to the regions.
5. The aspirations of national minorities to self-determination are also
contributing to Russia's disintegration.
30 million non-ethnic Russians live within Russia out of a total population
of 150 million. Of these, Tatars are most numerous, followed by Ukrainians,
Chuvashs, Bashkirs, Mordovans, etc. Legal inequalities between the ethnic
republics on the one hand, and the Russian provinces on the other, are also a
source of centrifugal tendencies. Bilateral treaties granted
ethnically-defined regions more control over their natural resources and
foreign trade. This arrangement offened the Russian regions. This, in turn,
triggered a "chain reaction" of escalating demands for more independence on
the part of ethnically Russian regions.
If Russia breaks up into a dozen or more countries, Tatarstan will become an
independent state. Will Tatarstan's complete and full independence from
Russia benefit the Tatar nation? Consider the following 8 arguments:
1. Tatarstan's emergence on the world stage as an independent state
corresponds to the wishes of of the majority of Tatarstan's population.
As we know, during a referendum in 1992 62% of all participants expressed
support for Tatarstan's independence. The referendum results were
subsequently ignored by Moscow and played down by President Shaimiev.
However, the referendum showed solid support in Tatarstan for the idea of
independence, even among the non-Tatar population. Unlike former Soviet
Central Asian republics, which are now independent states, Tatarstan had a
strong and popular pro-independence movement since 1989. While Central Asian
republics quite unexpectedly found themselves independent on the day the
Belovezhsk Treaty was signed, supporters of Tatarstan's independence clashed
with police on the streets of Kazan, and at some point, even temporarily
occupied the parliament building in order to force the deputies to declare
Tatarstan independent.
2. Tatarstan's independence would be benefitial economically for the
republic's population.
During the 1970's, Tatarstan was the major producer of crude oil in Russia
and contributed greatly to the Russian economy. Before the power-sharing
agreement betwen Moscow and Kazan was signed, Tatarstan had basically been
plundered by Moscow. Tatar oil, sold on world markets, brought in billions
of dollars to Moscow. Only a tiny amount of this wealth was given back to
Tatarstan in the form of subsidies. Since Tatarstan's oil was considered
Russia's property, federal taxes collected in Tatarstan were counted as the
only contribution of Tatarstan to central budget. Because the taxes were
smaller than subsidies, the illusion was created that Tatarstan depended on
Moscow's subsidies. But, of course, the oposite was true: Moscow's revenues
from Tatar oil were used to subsidize other regions.
3. Independent Tatarstan would be able to establish stronger ties with the
Tatar diaspora.
It is ironic that Barbados, with its 200.000 citizens, has embassies all over
the world, while Tatarstan, with its 3.7 million population does not have
one.
4. Independent Tatarstan would allow the Tatar nation to to take its
rightful place within the family of nations.
Righ now, many great Tatars contribute their talents to the glory and
prestige of other nations, while most of the world still thinks of Tatars in
terms of silly stereotypes that have no relation to reality. Gata Kamsky,
who has been the strongest chess player in the Western world during the last
few years, told me once that he'd be proud to play chess under the Tatar flag
if only Tatarstan were an independent state. When it comes to sports, it is
safe to say that if all the ethnic Tatar athletes who competed in the Olympic
Games belonged to a single team representing Tatarstan, the republic could
have been among the 10 top Olympic nations.
5. Independent Tatarstan would raise the self-esteem of the Tatar youth.
Most Tatars who went through the Soviet high school system remember the
taunts and giggles of ethnic Russian pupils during history lessons about the
"Tatar-Mongol yoke". It was so "unprestigious" to be a Tatar, that if you had
one Russian parent or grandparent, you inevitably chose to consider yourself
a "Russian".
6. The part of the Tatar language that deals with diplomacy, foreign
relations, international trade and politics will never develop without the
possibility of using these notions in practice. Tatarstan's independence
would create favorable opportunities for re-creating this part of the Tatar
vocabulary that existed before 1552.
7. Independent Tatarstan would be able to move faster towards market
economy.
Contrary to common misconceptions, Tatarstan is not an island of Communism in
the sea of market reforms. For example, Tatarstan has a law that allows
private ownership of land. Such a law does not exist anywhere else in Russia.
8. "Thanks" to Stalin, Tatarstan's borders include only one-fourth of all
Tatars of the Volga-Urals area. Tatarstan's independence would allow Kazan to
negotiate border changes directly with the republic's neighbours without
Moscow's participation.
-Sabirzyan Badretdin-
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3. Current situation in The Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya
Zülfiye Kadir, Bilkent University
According to some political observers, there are three ways for a regime
to stay in power after revolution and subsequent reduction of revolutionary
activities : police regime, totalitarian ideology, or patriotic war.
While Tatarstan adopted a regime with traces of totalitarianism, Chechnya
chose patriotic war.
Like in Tatarstan, in Chechnya there was a strong opposition movement to
the regime. Opposition movements represented by the National Congress of
the Chechen people, and the Vainakh Democratic Party lead by Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev became active proponents of independence. Under the pressure
of popular mass demonstrations and meetings organized by the National
Congress of Chechen People, Doku Zavgayev, former Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet and parliament were forced to hand over power.
On 27 October 1991 General Dudayev was elected president in Chechnya, one
month later, on 27 November 1991, the Chechen Republic proclaimed its
independence. While in general the Chechens regard the Ingush as one of
the Chechen tribes, Dudayev recognized the Ingush right to
self-determination. The Ingush, on their part, held a referendum on 30
November 1991, and established their own republic within the framework of
the Russian Federation.
One of the first decisions of the National Chechen Congress following the
election of Dudayev was to set up a Caucasian Independence Party - a
movement advocating pan-Caucasian unity. In one interview Dudayev stated:
"We must not forget that we bear a responsibility for the fate of our
sister-nations in the Caucasus. The union of all the Caucasian nations on
an equal basis is the only possible way for the future."
At the beginning Dudayev spoke up for Boris Yeltsin and his democratic
reforms. Dudayev was one of few political leaders, to oppose the junta
during the putsch.
The central authorities in Moscow have never recognized the sovereignty of
Chechnya. The Chechnya Republic, in its turn, has never accepted the
Russian constitution, sent the deputies to the Russian parliament, or
participated in the Russian presidential elections. After Tatarstans
treaty with Russia, Chechnya was the only republic in the Russian
Federation continuing to preserve its status of a sovereign state. Russia
unsuccessfully tried to impose on Chechnya Tatarstan-like sovereignty. The
Russian authorities saw no problem in defining Chechen status. The
Minister of Justice V.Kovalev said that it is quite normal that the
Chechens want "sovereignty", pointing out that Tatarstan, is also a "
sovereign state within the Russian Federation". Emphasizing in every case
that "Chechnya is an inalienable part of the Russian Federation", Moscow
persistently wanted to include Chechnya into the bilateral process of
federalization. The Tatar President Shaimiev was used by the Russian
authorities as a tireless persuader to attract the Chechens to sign
power-sharing agreement and accept the "Tatarstan Model" of sovereignty.
But Chechenya from the very beginning refused to accept the praised
"Tatarstan model". Dudayev expressed his attitude towards the "Tatarstan
model" by the words: "We will never sign a Treaty as Tatarstan did. It does
not grant the rights we are claiming."
The Russian parliament sent a delegation lead by Ruslan Khasbulatov to
Grozniy to convince Dudayev and his government to accept the status of the
"special" autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. Dudayev
repeatedly stated that the status of the Chechnya Republic can not be
lower than that of the states, members of the CIS.
Moscow immediately declared Dudayev and his government separatist, and
launched a "cold war", using such weapons as economic blockade,
psychological pressure, and promoting a "bandit" image of the Chechens in
the mass-media. The Chechen parliamentary elections of 1992 were declared
illegitimate, and the leader of the Chechen people Dudayev was proclaimed
a militant extremist, "bandit" and "number one terrorist".
Claiming that the regime in Chechnya was illegitimate,Yeltsin determined
to crush the Chechen resistance. Dudayev appealed for a "general
mobilization of the peoples of the Caucasus against Russian imperialism"
and warned the people to be ready for war.
On 11 December 1994, under the pretext of "restoring order on the
territory of Russian Federation", Russia declared full-scale war on the
tiny Chechen republic. Along with the advanced military artillery, tanks
and planes, explosive bullets, ball-bearing bombs, chemical and biological
weapons, prohibited by Geneva Convention, were used in the massive
military operations against Chechnya. In the bloody battles hundreds of
thousands of civilians, Chechen and Russian soldiers were killed.
"Even Defense Minister Igor Rodionov has provided updated casualty figures
for the Russian forces of 3 000 dead. If casualties suffered by Interior
Ministry troops and special units are added, the total number of troops
killed in 20 months of fighting comes to around 5000. This is equivalent
to about 30 per cent of the losses incurred by the Soviet Army after nine
years of fighting in Afghanistan. As for the number of civilian dead, it is
certainly the highest the country has suffered since the end of the Second
World War, and is estimated, to be anywhere from 30 000 to 100 000 people.
Each passing day of conflict decreased the prestige of the Russian army
and political leadership. In a TV address to the citizens of Russia on 31
March 1995, president Yeltsin stated: "Undoubtedly, we shall not put up
with the terrorist acts and shall respond to them adequately. The safety of
Russian citizens shall be ensured stringently. We together with the
military are firmly intent on securing a peaceful settlement of the issue."
Neither a "peaceful settlement" nor the safety of the Russian citizens
have been secured during this armed conflict. The federal forces killed
the Russian and Chechen civil population without any distinction.
The entire population of Chechnya has been mobilized to resist the
Russian army. The Ghazawat (jihad) was declared and mobilization of
volunteers began throughout the North Caucasus. Only the Chechen groups
headed by the same Doku Zavgayev, provided assistance to the Russian
forces.
During the years of the confrontation Moscow persistently continued to
favor the government of Zavgayev. Throughout the war, Russia sought to
impose its political puppets on Chechnya, to help to overcome Dudayevs
resistance. In the farcical election in December 1995, imposed and
sponsored by the Russian authorities, Moscows candidate Doku Zavgaev was
"elected" as a president. Although the installation of pro-Moscow
government of Doku Zavgayev increased internal tensions in Chechnya, the
scenario of replacement of the independence minded opposition , did not
work in Chechnya.
On the eve of the presidential elections, to guarantee public support
Yeltsin decided to initiate a "peace process". For this time the character
of the peace process was changed. To avoid contacts with Dudayev formally,
it was decided to apply a mediation method. President Yeltsin announced
the engagement of a series of rotating mediators, ranging from King Hasan
II of Morocco to leaders of the Russian republics. The most promising
intermediary, was the president of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiyev, a loyal
ally of Yeltsin. (There are some rumors that the official appointment of
the president of Tatarstan Shaimiev as a mediator on April 1996, ended with
the assasination of Dudayev on 21 April 1996.)
With the assassination of Dudayev, the Chechens were deprived of the
symbol of Chechen independence and their unifying force.But predictions
that the Chechen military commanders would fall into disarray did not
materialize, on the contrary the Chechens increased their military
activities.
After serious losses and military disasters, Russia again began the
negotiation process. Each round of negotiations began with ultimatums and
pre-conditions from the Russian side. In August 1996, after three rounds
of talks, a Russian-Chechen agreement was signed. But still the durability
of peace settlement in Chechnya is very uncertain.
In February 1997, presidential elections was held in Chechnya. Former
chief-commander of the Chechen army Aslan Maskhadov was elected president.
In an inauguration held on 12th February 1997 Maskhadov swore on the Koran
to reinforce the independence of the Chechen state. By allowing elections
to take place in Chechnya, the Russian government was compelled to
recognize the new Chechen government as the sole legitimate power in the
republic. Among the guests, attended the ceremony, was the main initiator
of the peace talks and withdrawal of the Russian army, former Security
Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed.
Tatar President Mintimer Shaymiyev, eagerly willing to mediate the
Chechen conflict a few months ago, did not attend the inauguration. The
inauguration ceremony coincides with a session of the Federation Council,
the upper house of Russian parliament, called to discuss the budget, and
Shaymiyev had to be present there.
Today the Chechen republic is adapting to the new post-war reality. The
war against the Russian army is over, but the war against the Russian
authorities is only beginning. Whatever the outcome of the present crisis,
independence is certainly the ultimate dream of the Chechens. Chechen war
ended, opening a new, unknown phase in the Russo-Muslim relations. The
ultimate secession of the Chechnya would encourage other republics to opt
for independence. Russia is aware of this. Therefore, every effort will be
made to maintain the current borders of the Russian Federation.This message
was given to the leaders of other regions and republics of the Federation.
Under these circumstances, unity is vitally necessary for the Caucasus
and other Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. There are expressions
of empathy and compassion towards Chechnya but, unfortunately, there is no
real unity among the North Caucasian peoples, which are driven by
nationalist conflicts and local political rivalries. There are many
local-scale popular front movements being established to defend the
ethno-cultural values of certain nations, but none of the Caucasus peoples,
except Chechnya and Abhasia, have expressed any desire for political
independece. Despite the common tragedies and shared historical and
political destiny, for the time being no strong united movement and
democratic political parties have emerged.
Today the Caucasus peoples live dispersed in their national republics, in
most cases assoCiating themselves with citizenship of their republic,
rather than with the supranational notion of being Caucasian Mountaineers
(Gortsy).
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4. Crimean Tatar journal Emel's Latest Issue (219) articles are put
to the SOTA's Kirim TATAR Home Page
URL: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html>
Emel is published bi-monthly in Ankara, Turkey (in Turkish).
Emel is the oldest still appearing Journal of Crimean Tatars. It began
published by the late Müstecip Ülküsal in Pazardjik Romania on 1 January
1930. Shortly thereafter its offices were transfered to Constanza. After 2.
World War Emel seized its publication until 1960. It began to reappear in
Istanbul in November of 196- as a "cultural magazine". Emel reports on
events, personalities and problems of Crimean Tatars, and is nowadays
published in Ankara.
Adress:
8. cadde, 77. sokak 17/1
06510 Emek / Ankara
Türkiye
Contents of EMEL Sayi 219 Mart-Nisan (March-April) 1997
Dr. Viktor Yuryeviç Gankeviç
1991 Sonrasi Kirim Tatar Milli Hareketi'nde Islam Faktörü
Islamic Factor in Crimean Tatar National movement after 1991
Ibrahim Maras
Ismail Gaspiralinin Bilinmeyen bir risalesi: Usul-i Cedid Nedir?
An Unknown Study of Ismail Gaspirali: Whatis the new method of education?
Ali Barut
Kirim hanligi ile Kuzey-Bati Kafkasya iliskilerinde Atalik muessesenin yeri
The institution of Atalik between the relations of the Crimean Khanate and
North-Western Caucasus
Dr. Yusuf Gedikli
Cengiz Dagci ve O Topraklar Bizimdi
Cengiz Dagci and its book: These soil were ours
Turgut Otçu
Diasporadaki köylerimizden: Izettin Köyü
>From Our Diaspora Villages: Izettin Village
Kirim Tatarlarindan Haberler (Mart-Nisan 1997)
News from Crimean Tatars (March-April 1997)
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5. KORA Centre for Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA)
Centre for Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) was established in 1992. It
was opened in Middle East Technical University, which is one of the best
qualified universities in Turkey.
Our aim is to provide an interdisciplinary environment which connects
scholars who are interested in Black Sea and Central Asian countries both
from social sciences as well as natural sciences departments.
Our objectives are;
· to develop relationships with scientific and economic organisations in
and outside the region which co-ordinate and motivate technical
co-operation in the area and provide researchers and professionals with
facilities to carry out studies and project activities,
· to develop new courses in different departments of METU, such as
sociology, history, linguistics, international relations, political science
and public administration; incorporating them into departmental curricula
in co-operation with the expertise available in the region,
· faculty and student exchange between METU and academic institutions in
the region and standardisation of educational curricula to facilitate such
exchange,
· to encourage fieldwork and international activity for regional
co-operation through co-operation projects, conferences and workshops on
subjects of relevance to the region.
We are willing to co-operate at all levels with other institutions abroad
and establish academic links, because we believe that joint development of
knowledge is necessary for this territory and the states which are trying
to integrate into the world.
In order to fulfill its objectives, KORA is conducting certain activities.
The Centre tries to increase the number and quality of specialists from
every discipline, interested in the region. For this purpose, "Financial
Support to Turkish Researchers" project has been continuing for two years.
A series of research projects carried out by faculty and graduate students
of METU including:
· a comparative analysis of Turkish Urban Family in Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan,
· the changing position of women in Uzbekistan,
· political culture and political participation in Kazakhstan,
· the establishment of market economy and the emergence of private
enterprise in Kyrgyzstan.
The research subjects of 1996 include;
· Comparison of Kazakhstans bilateral economic relations with Turkey,
European Union and Russian Federation,
· Political elites in Azerbaijan,
· The problems of exporting natural gas and petroleum in Turkmenistan.
KORA held an international conference on "Womens Identities and Roles in
the Course of Change: Central Asia, East and Central Europe and Turkey" on
23-25 October 1996, in Ankara. Focusing on the status of women in the
region, this conference was the first one in its field. The papers
submitted are going to be published in two volumes under the headings
"Gender and Structural Adjustment: Changing Public and Private Roles of
Women in East and Central Europe, Central Asia and Turkey" and "Gender and
Identity Construction in East and Central Europe, Central Asia and Turkey".
KORA not only deals with social sciences, but also plays an important role
to engage in research collaboration between Turkish scientists and their
counterparts in Central Asia. A recent example is the project conducted in
august 1996 by METU Chemistry Department and Uzbek Academy of Sciences,
Institute of Genetics on "Genome Mapping of Cotton or DNA Fingerprinting of
Cotton Varieties Using Microsatellite Markers".
An international seminar on "Waste Management and Environmental Pollution:
Water Resources and Water Treatment" was conducted on 5-11 September 1996
with the participation of related people from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
We also conduct seminars, given by the researchers interested in the
region. A few examples of which were on "The Energy Struggle in Caspian
Sea", "Market Economy and Entrepreneurship in Kyrgyzstan".
As you can see from the description above we try to appeal to a wide
spectrum of subjects, a wide range of countries. At present in METU more
than 10 experts on various levels of hierarchy of academic life are
working. We are aiming at establishing an MA programme on area studies in
future.
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5. Book review: (Mehmet Tutuncu)
Dr. Mehmet Kara: Ata Atacanov'un Shiirleri, Turk Dil Kurumu Yayinlari
671 Ankara 1997, I. Giris-Metin-Aktarma, 801 p. II. Inceleme-Gramer Dizini
1006p.
price: 1.260.000 Tl and 1.500.000 Tl
Researches on various Turkish Dialects ( The author Mehmet Kara considers
different Turkish languages spoken as dialects of each other, so Anatolian
Turkish and Turkmen Turkish are dialects of the same language) have speed
up lately. Though it is a fact that Turkmen Turkish and and Turkiye Turkish
are closest dialects of each other, very few researches have been done to
this dialect so far.
This impressive book is the first comprehensive study related to Turkmen
literature in Turkiye. The Book is made up two volumes. In the first
Volume: Introduction-Text-Translation contains all poems of famous Turkmen
poet Ata Atacanov (1922-1989).
The second one contains a research and Gramar index. In the introduction
the developement of Turkmen poetry until Ata Atacanov appears and Atacanovs
life-story, literary personality and works are placed.
In the Text all primary and secondary lengths are shown. In the translation
section poems are "translated" into Turkiye Turkish in rhyme. In the
research section Shape, content and language style are examined.
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7.a. Workshop on Central Asian Studies
PRELIMINARY CIRCULAR
(second circular with additional details available approximately August 1,
1997)
Workshop on Central Asian Studies
October 9-12, 1997
University of Wisconsin-Madison
HIGHLIGHTS:
1. Organizational Meeting for the CONSORTIUM FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
2. Annual Theme for 1997: THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA
3. Keynote Speaker: PROF. M. NAZIF SHAHRANI (Wilson Center & Indiana
University-Bloomington)
4. Special Workshop Session on the Use of Technology in Teaching the
Cultures &
Languages of Central Asia
5. Other scholarly & cultural programs
Sponsored by the
CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAM
and the
CENTER FOR RUSSIA, EAST EUROPE, AND CENTRAL ASIA
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON
Co-sponsored by the
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS OF TURKIC LANGUAGES
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONALITIES
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
JOHN D. SOPER CENTRAL ASIAN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE (UCLA)
The Central Asian Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (in
conjunction with the Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia) is
pleased to announce the convening of the second annual Workshop on Central
Asian
Studies on October 9-12, 1997 (arrival October 9 afternoon/evening --
departure
October 12 noon).
The goal of this annual workshop is to offer an opportunity for scholars,
institutions, and organizations interested in the Central Asian field to meet
annually to discuss how we research, teach, and coordinate efforts in the
Central Asian field. Each annual meeting of the Workshop on Central Asian
Studies will have a special theme around which there will be one or more
panels
with an emphasis on expanded discussion. The theme for the plenary session of
the 1997 meeting of the workshop is "The Formation of National Idenitities In
Central Asia". (The theme for the first meeting of the Workshop was "The
Legacy
of Russian Colonialism in Central Asia", and the tentative theme for the 1998
meeting is "Rewriting Central Asian History".)
Confirmation of presentation status will be available by September 15, 1997.
For more information contact adress and phone numbers are hereeunder after
7.b.
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7.b ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING CONSORTIUM FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
(TO MEET DURING THE WORKSHOP ON CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES -- OCTOBER 9-12,1997 --
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON)
PURPOSE:
Establish a Consortium for Central Asian Studies which should address the
following needs:
--establish academic-year and summer in-country programs
-- coordd Title VI)
-- collaborate on distance-education
-- collaborate on joint fundraising
In June 1997 the teachers of Central Asian languages organized a committee
consisting of Prof. Ilse Cirtautus (U. Washington-Seattle), Prof. Erika Gilson
(Princeton U.), and Uli Schamiloglu (U. Wisconsin-Madison) to draft a proposal
for a Consortium Agreement which should address these needs. The purpose of
this meeting will be to review, discuss, and finalize the draft proposal
(which
should be completed and available before the time of the meeting), vote
whether
to accept it, and elect any officers or institutions that might be required.
A number of colleagues and institutions have already expressed an interest in
such a Consortium for Central Asian Studies.
HISTORY:
There has been interest in recent years in initiating some broader form of
cooperation among institutions interested in Central Asian Studies (sometimes
more broadly defined to include larger parts of the Turkic world such as the
Caucasus, the Volga region, and elsewhere). This interest has come from
individual faculty members; from professional associations such as AATT (the
American Association of Teachers of Turkic Languages); funding agencies
such as
SSRC (which funds summer language programs); and the Title VI Program of the
U.S. Department of Education.
One of the first steps in this direction was taken during the May 1995 meeting
of the Workshop on the Proficiency-based Teaching of Central Asian Languages
held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. At that time, teachers of Central
Asian languages endorsed the idea of establishing a consortium for exchanges
with Central Asian universities. (While the idea is still valid, the top-down
approach adopted at that time was not workable with university administrators,
who in the end preferred a bottom-up approach.) This was followed by an
unsuccessful application to support a consortium for Central Asian Studies
(1996).
Most recently on June 5-8, 1997 the Social Science Council conducted the
"SSRC-JCSSS Central Asian Language Pedagogy Workshop" organized by Prof. Nazif
Shahrani and Prof. Ayse Rorlich (held in Washington, DC). This workshop, which
had been many years in the planning, was intended to help organize and reform
the teaching of Central Asian languages in the United States. Since SSRC
funds a
number of important summer programs in Central Asian languages, it also
emphasized the need for future cooperation and new strategies for dealing with
cutbacks in future funding. During the final discussion period, we revived the
notion of a "Consortium for Central Asian Studies" which the teachers of
Central
Asian Turkic languages had adopted in 1995. (This time it would be organized
from the bottom-up.) SSRC is willing to lend its imprimatur and support to
this
Consortium.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS:
IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS--U. Wisconsin-Madison has an exchange with Farabi Kazak
National University that could be included in a Consortium; other universities
with their own formal programs could collaborate in reciprocal relationships
through the Consortium or else develop new formal programs through the
framework
of the Consortium. Participating institutions should have access to each
other's
programs; the Consortium's program(s) could be opened up nationally to all
interested students as well. We should aim at building up programs in cities
such as Almaty, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Ashgabat, Baku, Kazan, Ufa, etc.
There is an urgent need for regular in-country summer language programs at the
third-year level or higher.
SUMMER LANGUAGE INSTITUTES-- An important long-term should be closer
cooperation
among summer language institutes, perhaps by coordinating summer courses or
through the establishment of a single rotating summer language institute (as
exist for other world areas). While this proposal is not intended to erode the
autonomy of individual language programs, teachers and programs will have not
choice but to cooperate as a result of future funding cutbacks (which are
already visible in our field!). The choice is cooperating among ourselves now
versus arbitrary cutbacks by funding agencies in which we have no say.
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
FOR SUBMISSION OF ABSTRACTS OR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia
University of Wisconsin
210 Ingraham Hall
tel. 608/262-3379; fax fax 608/265-3062
E-mail: creeca@macc.wisc.edu
OR
Uli Schamiloglu
Associate Professor of Central Asian Studies &
Coordinator, Workshop on Central Asian Studies
Department of Slavic Languages
University of Wisconsin
1452 Van Hise Hall--1220 Linden Drive
Madison, WI 53706 USA
tel. 608/262-7141 (office), 608/262-3498 (dept.), 608/265-2814 (fax)
E-mail: uschamil@macc.wisc.edu
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
8. Letters and reactions
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 18:49:33 -0400
>From: Batyr Muhametsaliev <mahamet@SALEM.WVNET.EDU>
>Subject: Statistical Mistake
>To: owner-turkistan-N@turkistan.org
>Reply-to: mahamet@SALEM.WVNET.EDU
>Organization: Batyr ForEx
>
>Dear Sirs:
>
>I really enjoyed reading <Turkistan-Newsletter> Volume
97-1:25a2,
>as of 22 July 1997. But a careful reader must have noted a
>significant misinterpretation of facts:
>
>
>> Even after the testing has stopped, the effects will
>> linger. A recent news report indicated that out of the
>> total population of Kazakhstan, --->seven million now suffer
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> from some form of cancer<---.
>^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>The total population of Kazakhstan is 17,267,554 (July 1994 CIA
est.),
>so seven million out of seventeen million would constitute
catastrophic
>>40 percent of population ill with cancer<, which, of course, is
not
true.
>
>Please correct me if I am wrong, or if I misunderstood the text.
>
>With Best Regards,
>
>Your devoted reader Batyr Muhametsaliev
>
Reaction of the author editorial board member:
From: paksoy@babbage.franklin.edu (H. B. Paksoy)
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 20:24:10 -0400
To: turkistan-l@turkistan.org
Subject: <Turkistan-L> Cancer in Kazakistan
Sender: owner-turkistan-l@turkistan.org
Reply-To: turkistan-l@turkistan.org
I assume the question relates to some of the reported
numbers/stats
contained in the paper entitled "Nationality or Religion....."
First, the ultimate points (among others) made in the paper
ought not be
lost:
A) A portion of the Kazaks have contracted cancer; B) the
reported cause is
nuclear tests conducted on Kazak soil, C) these nuclear tests
were staged by
the organs of the USSR, D) The Kazaks are endeavoring to
overcome this state-
inflicted malady with their own --very personal, individual--
resources,
E) As the effects of cancer, in many cases, do not emerge in the
short run,
or, are not necessarily reported, the final numbers may not be
known for a
generation or two.
Any number of documented cases of cancer caused by such an
incident, is
perhaps too many.
As for nature of numbers reporting: One might also recall
the Almati
incidents of 1986; where the organs of the USSR flatly stated
that there were
(3) deaths as a result of the demonstrations. The details may be
found in
Chapter Four of CENTRAL ASIA READER (NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
Secondly: The paper was writen (as noted at the
bottom of the paper, in 1991) some six years ago (and the
original
is date-stamped with the Register of Copyrights, Library of
Congress),
with sources then available. At the time, this study was the
first
to make those points in a rather hostile (in the euphoria of the
moment) environment.
If there now are more accurate/reliable
statistics/comments, we shall, of course, be very glad to know.
On the other hand, the said numbers and figures (as any other
human re-typed
material) might have been subject to human error; either at the
source,
or at the transcription/transfer stage, at least several times.
As the
reader/comentator in question is --very kindly--- knowledgeable,
keenly
attentive, articulate, mathematicaly literate, we are very
greatly indebted to
him for his lucid remarks. Perhaps we should involve the
Semipalatinsk survivors and the leaders (C. Aytmatov, O.
Suleymanov) of the said movement in this discussion to arive at
the real numbers; if we can.
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 13:22:59 -0400
From: Michael Taylor <RossHenson@compuserve.com>
Subject: Newsletter could be improved
In the last edition of Turkistan news you asked:
"Please feel free to let me know if there are ways in which you think
that the Newsletter could be improved"
Would it be possible to iclude a series on the smaller Turkic people
groups, with references to obtain further information. In your tailpiece
you mention that the newsletter includes these but I have not seen anything
on them. What about something on the Qashq'ai of Iran for example. Apart
from the fact of their existence I have found very little information.
-End of message-
- Note from the editor about these letter -
Turkistan-n is a newsletter, which wellcomes contributions about the
smaller Turkish people, we appeal to our readers to send materials.
************************************************
Mehmet Tutuncu
(SOTA) Research centre for Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Caucasus and Siberia
P.o. box 9642
2003 LP Haarlem
The Netherlands
e-mail: <mtutuncu@turkiye.net> or <sota@euronet.nl>
Turkish World Home Page:<http://www.turkiye.net/sota/sota.html>
Crimean Tatars Home-Page: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html>
*******************************
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