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<<>><<>><<>>.....TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER...ISSN:--1386-6265....<<>><<>><<>>
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<<>><<>><<>><<>>.....Volume:97-1:20a---9--July--1997.....<<>><<>><<>><<>>
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Special Issue on
_____________ "Encyclopedia Lithuanica" & Islam in Lithuania
_____________ The 'Religous Factor' in Central Asia and the Caucasus
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"Encyclopedia Lithuanica", published in 1976 in Boston by
Lithuanian-Americans, has a chapter on Tatars whose ancestors had settled in
Lithuania in the 13th-14th centuries. The following excerpt from the chapter
helps to understand the ethnic origin of the relatively less known subgroup
of Tatars, the so-called Lithuanian Tatars:
"Lithuania's wars with the Golden Horde resulted in the creation of many
Tatar communities in Lithuania. The earliest captives most likely had been
taken during the time of Mindaugas and Traidenis in the second half of the
13th century. But the majority of Tatars in Lithuania were settled there by
Vytautas the Great (1392-1430). These included not only prisoners of war and
refugees but also voluntary migrants who came looking for a better life.
Vytautas once boasted to the Teutonic Order that "many Tatars had come to
us, weary of wars, and yielding to our ways; they seek in our land peace and
a tranquil life."
It is well known that on his expedition to the Black Sea (1397-98) he brought
back Tatar settlers of two distinct religious persuasions: Islamic and
Judaic. Three hundered representatives of the latter were allowed to settle
at Vytautas' residence at Trakai. Later their number increased to 5.000.
Known as Karaites, they were considerably outnumbered by the Islamic Tatars,
who settled at or near Asmena, Vilnius, Trakai, Aukstadvaris, Semeliskes,
Butrimonys, Alytus, and other localities.
Engaging mainly in agriculture, crafts and commerce, the Tatars were allowed
to serve as public officials and soldiers. They were released from a number
of duties to the state, but had to perform military service and pay the poll
tax. In the armed forces they were segregated from the Lithuanian gentry,
forming their own units with their own commanders. By the privilege of 1588
their rights were equalized with those of the gentry.
Living in separate, closed communities, they long preserved their language,
faith, and customs. Greater assimilation with the local population began
only in the 18th century. During the period of Lithuanian national
independence (1918-40), Tatars maintained their religious communities at
Kaunas, Raiziai, and Vinksnupiai. In Raiziai (county of Alytus) they had
their mosque and school; it was also the seat of their imam (spiritual
leader). There were seven Tatar villages in the immediate vicinity. The
city of Kaunas had over 100 Tatar residents. An ancient mosque is still
preserved in the village of Keturiasdesimt Totoriz (Forty Tatars), which
received its name from the fact that Vytautas had settled 40 Tatar captives
there." SabirzyanB
Islam in Lithuania
Gyorgy Lederer
Central Asian Survey (1995), 14(3), 425-448
The author restricts himself to Muslim Tatars living in Lithuania, rather than
to more recent immigrants from Central Asia and other parts of the former
Soviet
Union. His justification for treating them separately from their Tatar
brethren in Poland and Belarus is that their experience since the 1940's
has led
to 'profound changes in their linguistical preferences and national character.
While Polish Tatars often consider themselves as Poles of Tatar origin (and
Islamic religion), although this is also a complicated issue, Lithuanian
Tatars
would definitely not regard themselves as Lithuanians even if they are loyal
citizens of their country and speak Lithuanian.' Only a minority spoke
Lithuanian before 1940 (when the area in which they live was controlled by
Poland) and many in the Vilnius region still speak Ruthene. As they lost
their
Tatar language early on and have since lost most of their folklore, the only
distinctive feature they have is Islam or its memory. Indeed Lederer
considers
that they cannot be called an ethnic group as when they abandon Islam they
cease
to be Tatars.
The Lietuvos Totoriu Kulturos Draugija (Cultural Society of Lithuanian Tatars)
was formed in 1988 with the wish of reviving their grandfather's creed, but
not
knowing much about it. Their first project was the restoration of the Kaunas
mosque which was inaugurated in 1991 and serves the 200 Kaunas Tatars. The
mosque at Raiziai (Rejze) about 18 kilometres from Alytus has also been
reconstructed. The original mosque dates back to 1556. 16, mainly elderly
families, live in Raiziai but the mosque is also used by the 500 Tatars who
live
in the Alytus district. A mosque has been restored in the village of Sorok
Tatar near Vilnius. However, Tatars only live in 31 of the 132 households
now.
The fourth working mosque in Lithuania is in the village of Nemezis
(Niemiez) on
the outskirts of Vilnius. The 1987 census implies that there are 5,100
Lithuanian Tatars.
In their history the Lithuanian Tatars cannot be distinguished from the
Polish &
Belarussian Tatars as originally they all lived in the Polish-Lithuanian state
and have been split up by the later imposition of borders. The first
influx of
Tatars were tribes fleeing from the islamization policy of Khan Ozbek who were
given refuge in pagan Lithuania during the reign of Gediminas (1316-41).
These
were assimilated and baptised, along with the Lithuanians by the end of the
14th
century. The first Muslim Tatars arrived in 1396-7 when Khan Tokhtemish, a
loser in a Golden Horde succession conflict arrived. Vytautas (Witold) the
Great (1392-1430) awarded them land in exchange for 12 weeks military service
annually. Vytautas also settled some Nogai Tatar prisoners of war. Other
refugees and prisoners arrived throughout the 15th & 16th centuries from the
Crimea, Kazan & Astrakhan. It has been suggested that the rapid loss of their
native tongue was mainly due to this arrival in small, disparate groups.
While
Vytautas gave the Tatars many privileges these were eventually whittled away.
Even so, Tatars have often been described as brave and loyal warriors of the
Polish state up to the 18th century and beyond. Under the Tsars Lithuanian
Tatars were encouraged in state administration and the army.
Eighteen Lithuanian Tatar generals are reported to have served in the Russian
army. Unlike their coreligionists in the rest of the Empire, the Muslims
of the
provinces that had formerly belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth
were
not incited to convert to Orthodoxy.
Many of the Tatar warriors managed to behave as 'good Poles' and loyal
subjects
of the Tsar.
When Lithuanian independence was proclaimed in 1918 most Tatar intellectuals
turned against it as Poles. When Vilnius was occupied by the Poles it
separated the 7000 Tatars of Poland from the 1500 in independent Lithuania
(and
the 4000 who now were in Soviet Belorussia). During the interwar years the
two
groups had only occasional contacts with each other. However, in 1940, all
Lithuanian-Polish Tatars found themselves under Soviet occupation.
The Tatars appear to have reacted to the German invasion in much the same
way as
the rest of the population and after the Soviet victory about 10% of the Tatar
population was deported, the same proportion as for the general population.
About 1500 to 2000 Tatars were 'repatriated' from Vilnius and the surrounding
area as 'Poles' to Gdansk, Szczecin and Gorzow Wielkopolski.
After 1944 only one mosque, Raiziai, remained open in Lithuania and most
outward
signs of Islam disappeared.
The consumption of alcohol and pork became increasingly widespread, although I
was told by old Tatars that pig-keeping had begun for economic reasons. It
was
easier to satisfy the German and then the Russian quotas of meat
requisition by
rearing pigs rather than cattle which needed more time and investment.
Muslim Tatars started to celebrate Christian holidays although 'they should
not
have done so because these were not their feasts',as they themselves told me.
On these occasions, they lit candles in their homes. Just like their brothers
in Poland, they changed the number and the form of the prostrations of
communal
prayers, and chanted like Christians did during their ceremonies.
Most of their literature was in Ruthene (but written in Arabic script) except
for the prayers which were in Arabic or Turkish. Their Korans were usually
hand
copied or printed in Kazan or St. Petersberg at the turn of the century.
In 1988 the Cultural Society of Lithuanian Tatars was formed. They decided to
turn to Islam and official Turkey proved to be their main sponsor.
However, the
first organisation to invite them was the Ahmadiyya movement. In 1991 a Tatar
delegation met the Fourth Caliph in London and in 1992 Ahmadiyya missionaries
settled in Alytus. However, relations became strained and the Tatars have now
broken relations with the missionaries who are now trying to convert the
Lithuanians. However, most Russian Islamic publications available in
Lithuania
are provided by the Ahmadis, written by the Kazan Tatar poet Ravill Buharaj.
The main ideological and practical help seems to come from Arab students
living
in Kaunas.
There has been quarrelling in the Tatar Society between the delegates from
Vilnius and the rest of the country about the allocation of resources. In the
spring of 1997 there are planned celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the
settlement of Tatars in the Grand Duchy.
posted by Michael Taylor
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PERSPECTIVES ON CENTRAL ASIA
Published by the Center for Political and Strategic Studies
The 'Religous Factor' in Central Asia and the Caucasus
The Religious Factor?
—Dr. Georgi Derluguan, United States Institute of Peace
Does religion matter in places like Central Asia and Caucasia?
Journalists, investors, experts and government officials all believe
that it does. But in which ways? Some say it is a potent, deeply-rooted
"Religious Factor" which behaves autonomously and determines everything
in the societies of the region? But religion in the area of our concern
denotes a set of three main components which only partially coincide:
ritual practices associated primarily with life-cycle events (births,
weddings, funerals, etc.); popular beliefs and morally-sanctioned norms;
and, lastly, formal social institutions (churches, religious boards).
All elements were profoundly affected by the experience of Soviet
modernization.
The words "religion" and "Soviet era" are normally associated
with harsh repression, which isn't unjust. Yet Soviet secularization had
a much more profound general effect on religion by offering not only
punishment for religious practice, but also tangible social gains for
abandoning the religious practices and becoming a modern Soviet man or
woman. In the larger urban centers of the USSR, the percentage of people
who regularly observed religious practices and were well familiar with
the doctrine (what sociologists call the core religious believers) by
the end of the Soviet rule had dwindled to single digits. Despite the
celebrated resurgence of religion after the fall of state socialism,
this percentage has remained the same. A majority of people in all
former Soviet republics proudly confess religious beliefs, but if we
take a closer look we will see an astonishing void behind such
pronouncements. The number of practicing believers (those regularly
praying and participating in church, mosque, or synagogue services) is
nearly as low as it was ten years ago.1
In the early nineties it simply became safe and fashionable to declare
oneself religious. Former Communist officials, as well as their
opponents, rushed to religion as a substitute for the potent ideology
that had just disintegrated. In most cases the existing religious
hierarchies proved woefully unprepared for the new role, although they
were obviously enjoying their new visibility, prestige and material
benefits. Such a situation was inevitably fraught with corruption and
internicine struggles. It was ultimately damaging to the established
religions: a reputed racketeer or vodka-distilling tycoon from
Kabardino-Balkaria or Chechnya who donates money to build a mosque in
his native village inevitably makes the new piety look grotesque. But
the outcomes will be highly original and influential of future
developments.
Soviet order did not perish because of any religious uprising, not even
the Muslim challenge which was once commonly predicted by Western
experts who were much impressed by the Iranian example. In fact, Soviet
order still permeates state institutions in the Caucasus, and it is
surviving rather intact in much of Central Asia. The crucial question is
what form will the future contestation of this order assume? One may be
sure that the current neo-Soviet regimes under the guise of national
paternalism will be contested because they are much weaker than the old
Soviet order and because they are so obviously inept and corrupt.
Alternatives to the present rulers can be neither Marxist socialist,
because for better or for worse this ideology has been discredited, nor
Western liberal for its sheer impracticality in the countries where
Westernized elites do not trust their "unwashed masses." Two possible
ideologies remain—nationalist and religious.
Here Central Asia seems to diverge radically from the Caucasus. In the
Caucasus, historically Christian Armenia and Georgia led the way at the
turn of the century in the formation of strong modern nationalisms.
Other peoples of the Caucasus followed suit, not rarely under direct
pressure from the more advanced nationalisms (Azeris countermobilizing
against Armenians, or Abkhaz and Ossets agaisnt Georgian challenges).
Smaller nationalities of the Northern Caucasus developed their
nationalisms in relations to Russia—cooperative, loyal nationalism of
the Ossets at one extreme, and the rebellious, actively defensive
nationalism of the Chechens at the other. The peoples of Central Asia
lack historical nationalisms. For a variety of reasons Central Asians
missed the window of opportunity when the Russian empire broke up in
1917 and became, in the celebrated expression of Ronald Suny, "an
incubator of nations." Their posterior nation-building was conducted
strictly from above and produced rather mixed results. Therefore in
Central Asia, religion—namely a more activist version of Islam—seems the
only realistic opportunity for the coming popular mobilizations against
the ruling regimes. It is also clear that in areas where the rural
population has been growing faster than the more Europeanized urban
populations, contestation of corrupt authority and the idea of social
justice is also likely to assume the Third World anti-urbanite élan.
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Yanki Pursun ---------------------------------------------------------
http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/~puersuen
fyp@usa.net puersuen@stud.uni-frankfurt.de
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