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<>><<>><<>> TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER ISSN: 1386-6265 <<>><<>><<>
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<>><<>><<>> Editor/Manager: Mehmet Tutuncu <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> Business: H. Savas, S.Bogut <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> Features: I. Noyan-Izmirli, Y. Puersuen <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> Associate Editors: A. Baguirov, Z. Kadir <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> Technical: T. Ates, K. Cagiltay <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> Editorial Board: Dr.T.Kocaoglu, Dr. M. Hubey <<>><<>><<>><<>
<>><<>><<>> dr. Nesrin Sariahmetoglu <<>><<>><<>><<>
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<>><<>><<>><<>> Vol: 97-1:4 3 June 1997 <<>><<>><<>><<>><<>
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Uze kok tengri asra yagiz yer kilintukta ekin ara kisi ogli kilinmis.
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THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Zulfiye Kadir
- Part One -
The Phenomenon of Nomenclatura in the Muslim Republics of the Russian
Federation
The dramatic upheaval of October 26, 1917 changed the fate of the
Muslims. Lenin’s promise about self-determination and the right of
secession was nothing but a deceptive tactical maneuver to win the support
of the Muslim minorities. Hopes for national self-rule dimmed after the
Revolution, when all the Muslim organizations such as Milli Þura, Millet
Mejlisi, and Harbi Þura were dismantled. All the Muslim nations were
thoroughly divided into the numerous artificial quasi-autonomies,
subordinated to Moscow thereby frustrating their desire to unite and
regain equality. By imposing "autonomous structures"on the Muslim
nationalities, the Bolsheviks suppressed all the previous aspirations of
the Muslims to consolidate, so long ripened and cherished by them.
With the the stabilization of the Soviet regime the Soviet leaders
subsequently demonstrated that they had no intention of allowing the
national minorities to exercise the right to decide important internal
matters in any sphere. Towards the end of the 1920’s, Moscow started to
oppose every manifestation of national individualism, and gradually, all
Muslim national efforts and almost everything that has been achieved during
the years before the revolution came to an end.
The post-revolutionary fate of the Muslim peoples of Russia was shaped
within the framework of the so-called Nationalities Policy, and almost all
the Muslim nations of Russia fell victim of this policy. The key of the
Soviet success in imposing central control over the Muslim territories may
be found in the Nationality Policy. The main objective of the Nationality
Policy was the division of the Muslim community as far as possible,
creation of the artificially drawn titular Autonomous Republics and
regions, and isolation of different Muslim areas from one another and from
outside influences. Five Muslim nations ( Crimean Tatars, Chechens,
Ingush, Karachay-Balkars, and Meskhetian Turks) were removed from their
ancestral homelands and deported to the remote places in Central Asia and
Siberia.
To establish economic and technological dependency of the national
peripheries upon Russia, the Soviets artificially divided the Muslim
population on a great number of separate elements that had no direct links
with one another. Since the October revolution, dozens of national
formations have been created by the Kremlin leadership. The Soviets
apparently considered the national aspirations of the Muslims of Russia
satisfied by the creation of these autonomous republics. The problem of
non-Russian minorities has been solved by retention of absolute power in
the hands of the central authorities in Moscow. The final Sovietization of
the Muslim nations was achieved by the co-optation of native elites who,
by joining the "Communist class", have become as alienated from the rest of
their ethnic milieu as the Russian apparatchiks are.
Moscow had no confidence in the political reliability of the old Muslim
national communist intelligentsia, therefore the creation of new national
cadres loyal to Moscow was imperative. To provide a standard governing
apparatus everywhere and minimize the danger of the internal disorder, the
Soviet system created the phenomenon of nomenclatura - nationless Communist
partocrats.
To defuse the unrest and mollify the intelligentsia it was necessary to
make concessions in language policy and nativization of the apparatus of
the republics.This nativization would provide the means for promoting
workers, who were less educated and more dependent upon Stalin’s machine,
into leadership roles where they could then supplant the more obstreperous
intelligentsia.
The Kremlin leadership realised that the only way to ensure effective
control over the Muslim regions was to train an indigenous local Party and
state bureaucracy which would be loyal to Moscow. The decision to create a
national communist elite was prescribed by Lenin and approved by the 8th
Communist Party Congress in 1919:
The allocation of Party workers is wholly in the hands of the Party
Central Committee. Its decisions are obligatory for all. The Central
Committee guarantees the conducting of the most resolute struggle against
all forms of localistic tendencies and separatism in these matters.
The drive was launched to train Party cadres which were "national in form
and socialist in content". The Communist University of Workers of the
East was established in Moscow to train reliable, cadres. Later this
development was followed by the foundation in each republic of the
notorious Party Schools ( Partshkola ), the purpose of which was to turn
out élite of functionaries to execute all orders from Moscow.
In the past the cooperation of native politicians with Moscow was
essential for success, today the situation is not different. All the power
positions in the national republics are still occupied by former
Communists. The national Communist parties continue to rule in all the
republics, albeit under different party names. To enhance their power
position, the leadership in the republics has to be in a tacit alliance
with the Russian authorities. In its turn the existencence of national
bureaucrats is necessary for the Russian authorities. The presence of
national nomenclatura in the republics make it easier for the central
authorities in Moscow to deal with any kind of opposition at the local
level. As long as the present nomenclatura remains in power it will not be
difficult for the Russian authorities to terminate any unwanted political
movements in the ethnic republics. Nowadays the old power division system
works even more effectively than before: all kinds of democratic and
national progressive forces in the ethnic republics are suppressed by
the hands of their own "national" nomenclatura, the loyal guards of the
old regime and central authorities. Moscow, cut short any nationalistic
agitation questioning its rule; at the same time it showed remarkable
tolerance toward abuses of power by local native authorities.
Separation of the Muslim community into quasi-nation states headed by
subservient emissaries of the central power served Moscow’s interests in
the Soviet years, and seems to do the same in the post-Soviet period.
Therefore, when analyzing current political parties and movements in the
Muslim republics today, it is essential to give adequate attention to
those who occupy power positions in the national republics, i.e. national
nomenklatura through which the Center still successfully exercises its rule.
The national leadership in the ethnic republics could not get rid of the
traditional totalitarian mentality and centralized power structures, and
continue to treat every political formation outside the government with
exaggerated suspicion and hostility. The present governing apparatus in the
national republics, is ill disposed to everything that develops
independently from the government course, seriously impeding the
activities of the opposition. Today it is much more difficult for the
national political movements to voice their aspirations due to severe
discriminative measures imposed by the national nomenclatura to satisfy
the central authorities. If the dimension of the flagrant power abuses by
the national political elite in the Central Asian republics alarms
international human rights organizations, in the Muslim republics of the
Russian Federation the situation is not much different. Thus the
camouflaged political terror and oppression of the national opposition in
Tatarstan resulted in the consolidation of several political movements and
parties of different ideologies under the Popular Patriotic Union of
Tatarstan in a protest towards the current antidemocratic regime.
Although modern Islamic revival does not challenge the state system, the
present leadership consisting of old Communists is against everything that
can constitute political opposition, with no exception for Islam. Despite
the fact that Islam helps to rehabilitate the national cultures and
national identity of the Muslims, the national nomenclatura in the
Muslim republics have little interest in strengthening political Islam in
their republics.
Today without a proper understanding of the political structure of the
Muslim republics, political culture, traditions and the mentality of their
leadership, it will be difficult to comprehend the current political
potential concentrated in these republics. Since the potential of
political unity of the Muslims of Russia is the subject of this research,
I find it necessary to illustrate the political situation inside each
autonomous republic. Political unity can be realized under the certain
conditions such as: uniformity of demands, similarity of goals,
appropriate leadership based on unity of mind, and desire to unite. Today,
the myriad of local problems, that all the Muslim republics inherited from
the Soviet past, hampers the unification of the Muslims.
The Republic of Tatarstan.
The Tatar Autonomous Republic has been artificially constructed in such a
manner as to exclude a large proportion of the Tatar population. In this
regard the Tatar Republic is unique among the Soviet Republics; in none of
the others does the indigenous population represents so small a proportion
of the total. At the time of its formation in 1920, the boundaries were
drawn in such a way as to encompass only 1 459 600, or little more
than a third of the approximately 4 200 000 Tatars then living in the
Soviet Union.
The unfavorable position of the Tatars in Russia is explicable first by
historical factors, and, second by distrust of the Tatars, who both before
and after the revolution made constant attempts to gain independence for
themselves and other Turkic peoples. To avoid such a threat the Soviet
regime adopted a nationality policy in regard to the Tatars aimed at
keeping them a minority in their own republic. After the elimination of
Tatar national schools, standard Soviet schools were established and, thus,
the compulsory teaching of Russian became the means for the upbringing of
the new international man. (Never under the communist rule did the Tatar
population in Tatarstan exceed 50% out of the total population in the
republic). .
Although the Tatars were one of the largest peoples of the Soviet Union,
the Tatar republic was granted only an autonomous status. Stalin reported
scornfully that the Tatars had as much chance of achieving Union republic
status as of seeing their own ears. The official Soviet explanation for
the Tatar Republic’s lack of Union status was that it does not border on
the Soviet frontiers. Technically speaking it is so, but the main reason
behind this inferior status was the right of secession; in case of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, all the Union republics could
automatically become independent states, whereas Autonomous republics did
not have such a right.
In the complex federative system of the Soviet Union, the Tatar and
Bashkir Autonomous Republics became the constituent republics of the
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), which itself was one
of the constituent republics, a Union republic of the Soviet Union. In a
comparatively short period, between 1920 and 1923, the government of the
RSFSR established on its territory seventeen autonomous regions and
republics. But in reality, the central government treated these
autonomous republics only as a administrative districts, rather than
autonomous ethnic entities.The government of the RSFSR retained in the
conquered territories full control over military, economic, financial, and
foreign affairs.
The autonomous regions (sometimes called "Toilers’ Communes") had no
distinguishing juridical features even in terms of Soviet law and were
described by one Soviet authority as "national gubernii". The autonomous
republics,on the other hand, were regarded as endowed with a acertain
degree of political competence, although what the limits of this competence
were posed a question that troubled the best legal minds of the time.
As was mentioned earlier, the attributes of the Soviet form of government
in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were more or less similar to those in other
autonomous republics: the farcical Supreme Soviet and Presidium with no
real authority, the Council of Ministers, and all-powerful Republican
Committee of the Communist Party. The only organ that hold real power was
the Republican Committee of the Communist Party. In all republics, oblasts,
krays and rayons the whole state governmental structure was subordinated to
the control of the Party apparatus, or to the Central Committee of each
republic.The First Party Secretary of the Central Committee was a national,
whereas the Second Secretary a Russian. Local non-Russian communists, who
did not know Russian, could not work in the Party apparatus. In consequence
of their minority status within their own republics many Muslim peoples in
the Russian Federation lacked full opportunity to play a leading part in
the economic, administrative and cultural life of the republic and of the
Federation.
It is quite natural that during the seventy years of the Soviet regime
nothing significant could happen in the political life and administrative
structure of the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation.
The ideological vacuum, which occurred after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, brought nations back to their historical roots. After the years of
state-led oppression, the idea of national self-determination overwhelmed
national republics. Immediately, as a natural phenomenon, at the end of the
1980-s numerous national front movements and political parties emerged in
the ethnic republics, raising the concept of independence and the right of
self-determination.Among the first republics proclaimed independence was
Tatarstan.
But change in the political status of the republic did not result in
change of the administrative cadres of Tatarstan. As in almost all of the
states, Soviet-era leaders have held onto power in Tatarstan. The Russian
authorities quickly realized that the only way to keep Tatarstan under
control was the preservation of the old communists in power. The Yeltsin
administration knew, that if a compliant regime existed in Tatarstan, then
Russian authority would certainly prevail. The most powerful element of
the Soviet society responsible for the preservation of the regime had been
always the Party apparatus. Thus, the Moscow authorities gave Shaimiev
absolute power, the right to perform the role of ideological gendarme,
but under one condition - to eliminate the national opposition. Shaimiev
firmly guaranteed Moscow that he "will never allow the extremist forces to
seize power in Tatarstan". These "extremist forces" in Tatarstan were
advocating not only independence of Tatarstan, but also the unity of
Turco-Muslim subjects of the Russian Federation.Today in the Muslim
republics the initiatives concerning unity along the Turkic or religious
lines come from the opposition parties, the official governments avoid
dealing with the issues that may create an aggresive counteraction from
Moscow.
For the Russian authorities it was vitally important that Tatarstan forget
its aspirations for independence, while for the local communists it was
essential to stay in power at any cost. Thus, two fundamental threats -
the possibility of secession, and national-patriotic movements would be
eliminated simply by one maneuver, by retaining the old apparatus in
power. For the sake of his power position, Shaimiev quickly forgot that it
was the Tatar nationalists who saved him from the hands of the Russian
court for his support of the coup d'état in 1991.
Consequently after 1993 the government of Tatarstan openly began to
deviate from the sovereignty line. The sovereign course of Tatarstan ended
with the Bilateral Treaty on Mutual Delegation of Authorities signed in
February 1994. The Treaty opened a new stage in the development of Russian
federalism.
The bilateral power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Tatarstan is merely
a broad statement of principles. The key power-sharing arrangements were
detailed in 12 cooperation agreements where the autonomous rights of the
republic are severely restricted.The bilateral treaty makes up 60-70 per
cent of the Federal Treaty’s text. Althogh federal authorities claimed that
they had granted broad powers to the "sovereign republics within the
Russian Federation", in reality nothing changed in the economic and
political status of the republics. The ownership of land and natural
resources were put under the joint jurisdiction of the local and federal
governments. The Treaty recognizes the authority of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation. When signing the bilateral treaty that marked the
legal end of the sovereignty of his republic, the Tatarstan president
Shaimiev proudly concluded: "Strong Republics, strong center." However
Tatarstan did not become stronger. After the signing of agreement, it
turned out to be no more than an administrative sub-division of the Russian
Federation with administrative organs whose functions are essentially
identical to those in any of the other territories.
For Moscow signing the power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan was very
important, to serve as a model to regulate relations with other republics,
specially with Chechnya. Later, a series of treaties on the same basis was
concluded with other resource-rich republics such as Bashkortostan,
Sakha, Kabartay-Balkar, North Ossetia, Buryatiya and Udmurtiya. Along with
"sovereign" state Tatarstan, Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, Krasnodar,
Komi-Permyak and many other of Russia’s regions concluded bilateral
treaties with Moscow. Only the republic of Chechnya was an exception to
the bilateral treaty club.
Although only a few of these treaties were published and nobody knows the
exact details behind the numerous cooperation agreements enclosed in the
treaties, according to the federalists such treaties minimize the secession
potential of the ethnic republics.Yeltsin was absolutely right when he
said that bilateral treaties "strengthen Russian statehood". As the
bilateral treaties advanced, the federal government altered the terminology
in the documents to limit recognition of statehood.Concern of the central
authorities about "legal separatism" in the regions is already expressed in
a law declaring the Russian constitution and federal legislation to be
supreme throughout Russian Federation territory. The law, recently adopted
by the state Duma on 25 April 1997, in its nature rejects the bilateral
power-sharing agreements signed between the federal government and 26
regions.
Since that time the relationship between the national political élite and
their Russian patrons remained stable and balanced. One month after the
signing of the treaty, Tatarstan president Shaimiev and Tatarstan Supreme
Soviet Chairman Farid Muhametþin became deputies to the federal council of
the Russian parliament. To assure his loyalty to Russia, the president of
the Tatarstan Republic M.Shaimiev became one of the leading members and
most active supporters of the Russian prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin’s
movement "Our Home is Russia".
In Tatarstan, Shaimiev was treated as a traitor; as a Shah Gali by the
Tatar national movement , but Moscow seemed to be very satisfied. If in
the past the Yeltsin administration perceived Tatarstan as a serious threat
to the Russian territorial integrity and "bad example" for other autonomous
republics, now Tatarstan became an exemplary model for the regulating
federal relations. Thus, instead of Tatar statehood, the Tatar people get
a "Tatar model of statehood."
Now the political course of sovereign Tatarstan develops in the shadow of
the political course chosen by the Russian government.The political and
economic situation in Russia has considerable influence on Tatarstan,
specially its economy.
As soon as the Federal authorities secured the position of Tatarstan
within the Russian borders, they launched a campaign against the Tatar
national-patriotic movements.This was done, as many times in the history,
by the hands of the Tatar nomenclatura. The scenario was simple:
counter-rallies organized by the local nomenclatura to hinder the
"unconstitutional behavior" of the opposition. This scenario was effective
in all ethnic republics, except Chechenya.
The reorganization of power echelons was immediately accomplished in the
republic.By manipulating election rules, Shaimiev expelled members of the
opposition from the highest legislative and executive organs. All the
heads of local administrations, were subordinated directly to the
President himself.
To counteract to the All-Tatar People Kurultay and Milli Meclis, the
puppet International Congress of Tatars and its Executive Committee was
created from the state budget. Legal proceedings were initiated against
the Milli Meclis, the Ittifaq party, and individual leaders of the national
movement.. The political parties that supported independence were refused
in registration in the regions, under the pretext that their actions
endangered stability in the republic.The culmination of all this was the
arbitrary decision of the court to expel Ittifaq from its building.
To show that the demands for sovereignty come not from the legislative
organs but from the group of peoples on the street meetings, the
authorities spent all efforts to keep the nationalist and democratic
parties out of the Parliament. During the last parliamentary elections in
Tatarstan, which were held in 1995, the whole state apparatus was
mobilized to prevent "extreme" forces from winning the seats in the
Parliament.
Until 1995, the highest executive and administrative organ of Tatarstan
was the Gossovet (State Council). In the past it possessed real authority,
but today its nominal powers are severely restricted. After the general
elections in 1995, the Tatar parliament was immediately re-structured, and
the old-guard bureaucrats and the heads of administration took the
parliamentary seats of democrat and national-patriots. Many laws adopted
by the old Parliament were altered or canceled, and new laws giving
absolute authority and limitless power to the President were adopted. Even
the Constitution endured numerous amendments; many articles were
eradicated and replaced by new ones. Thus, in the old Constitution the term
of presidency was limited: the president could not be reelected more than
two times, and the age of the president could not exceed 65. The newly
elected parliament, by an order of the president Shaimiev, abolished this
article and adopted a new concept of unlimited life-long presidency.
Although the Tatar language is proclaimed as a state language, meetings in
the Parliament are held in Russian.
The official government of the sovereign Tatar Republic is a typical
example of the government of an autonomous republic of the Russian
Federation. It works under close supervision by the President and does not
enjoy much power in practice. In the past the government, Cabinet of
Ministers and Ministers had to be ratified through the Parliament, now all
the members of the executive apparatus are appointed personally by the
President himself, without any ratification by the Parliament.
During the presidential elections on 1996, president Shaimiev was
re-elected. He was the sole candidate on the ballot. The Russian
constitution prohibits candidates from running unopposed, but the amended
Tatar constitution does not.
Due his political compliance and pliability the present president of
Tatarstan has never enjoyed much confidence in the eyes of the national
intelligentsia. Today the purely selfish interests of the leading political
élite, clash with the patriotism and nationalism of the local opposition
parties. Such division in political leadership in the national republics
created two completely separate groups of as state leaders and national
leaders. The only exception was the ethnic region where the republican
leader was himself also the leader of the nationalist organization - Chechnya.
For a better understanding of the political situation in Tatarstan, it
is necessary to know that today the Tatar people and the people of
Tatarstan are two different things. The Soviet autonomous republics were
designed with the purpose to create mixed, polytechnic republics. The
republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are the best example of this
ethno-administarive experiment. Today neither Tatarstan nor Bashkortostan
may claim that their republics belong to the Tatar or Bashkir nations. Both
republics have considerable amount of Russian population, which is also an
inalienable part of the people of Tatarstan or Bashkortostan. There are
the peoples, or simply the citizens of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Today
the statehood of Tatarstan is based on the principle of territorial
(geographic), not ethnic sovereignty. The Tatarstan state is described by
the Tatar president Shaimiev as "a democratic state expressing will and
interests of the whole multinational people of the republic". Therefore,
the government of Tatarstan using the slogan: "Tatarstan is for the
Tatarstanis" (Tatarstan dlya Tatarstantsev), conducts a balanced policy
towards the abstract Tatarstani people, "expressing the will and the
interests of the whole multinational people of Tatarstan". The interests
of the Tatar people are represented by the government only as much as the
interests of the Russians and other nationalities.
Those who are interested in the political and historical development of
the Tatar nation alone, must not associate the development of the Tatar
nation within the context of the political course of the government of
Tatarstan, because the government of Tatarstan represents the interests of
all the peoples, citizens of Tatarstan, not the Tatar nation. Today only
the Tatar national movement openly, without fear, deals with the numerous
problems of the Tatar nation. Without their tireless efforts, Tatarstan
would not have been able to achieve even the paper sovereignty which it now
enjoys. Had there been no national political movement in Tatarstan, the
legal status of the republic would not differ from those of other
regions of Russia. Thanks to the political traditions of the Tatar
intelligentsia and high political culture of the Tatar people, the Tatar
nation has once again openly demonstrated its willingness to survive as a
distinct nation.
The Republic of Bashkortostan.
The autonomous Bashkir Republic was established on March 23, 1919 on the
basis of a vernacular with no written form. Up to creation of the two
separate Tatar and Bashkir republics, Tatar was a common language for
Tatars and Bashkirs. It is difficult to find other peoples in Russia and
the former Soviet Union so close and akin to each other as Tatars and
Baskirs. Being an enclave, Baskortostan, like Tatarstan was isolated from
the rest of Islamic world. Despite the commonality of history, culture and
language, today the Bashkirs do not support the idea of unification or
confederation with Tatarstan. Before the Revolution there was no antagonism
between the Tatar and Bashkir peoples, but nowadays Tatarstan’s relations
with Bashkortostan are far from satisfactory.
A new republic of Bashkortostan was constructed in such a manner as to
have a large number of Tatars within its borders reduced the Bashkirs to a
minority status within their own republic. In 1922 the districts of
Belebeev, Birsk, and Ufa, where the Tatars represented the majority of the
population, were excluded from Tatar Republic and joined to Bashkortostan.
As a result of artificial division, the Bashkirs constitute only 21.9.
percent out of total population in Baskortostan, after the Russians, who
are 39.3, and Tatars who are 28.4 percent.
Bashkortostan and Tatarstan have followed very different national
policies. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bashkir leadership
adopted pro-Russian policies which do not emphasize political sovereignty.
Bashkortostan from the beginning signed the Federal Treaty and became an
eager proponent of the policy of integration with Russia. While Tatarstan
boycotted the referendum in 1993, Bashkortostan actively participated in
it, giving full support to Yeltsin and his policies.
Later, when Tatarstan was forced to sign a bilateral treaty on the
mutual delegation of authorities, Bashkortostan authorities scornfully
noticed that "unlike Tatarstan they have a firm course, and they never
changed their position 180 degree as Tatarstan does". Politicized
ethnicity among the Bashkirs was not as strong and popular as among the
Tatars. Therefore, from the beginning, the Bashkir President Murtaza
Rahimov stressed the economic sovereignty of the republic. The government
of Bashkortostan has always concentrated on economic problems, disregarding
serious political problems inside the republic. Such intensive claims of
economic autonomy are based on dreams of a petroleum paradise. The
Bashkir authorities believe that by gaining full control over the
country’s oil reserves, the republic will secure its economic prosperity
and welfare. But it can not be said that Bashkortostan has made
considerable headway in gaining economic independence.The export of oil,
petrochemical goods and products of the military-industrial complex are
still under the strict control of the Russian authorities. All hopes about
economic self-rule disappeared when Bashkortostan was forced to sign the
economic supplementary to the federal treaty. In other words, like
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan has as much independence as the bilateral treaty
permits it to have.
Another reason for the concentration on economic issues is the existence
of serious political problems. By giving priority to economic issues, the
Bashkir leadership has removed the national problem from the agenda of the
republic.
Bashkortostan is a typical example of a polyethnic state, but the
leadership generally ignore the ethno-national structure of the
republic. Although the Bashkirs constitute only 21.9 per cent of the total
population in the republic - stay on the third place after the Russians
and Tatars - the present Bashkir government treats the republic as a
national state with one central ethnos - the Bashkirs. It is doubtful
whether the Soviets have succeeded in providing the Bashkirs with a
specific national culture and a Bashkir historical tradition.Therefore, the
Bashkirs are extremely conscious of Tatar domination.
Since 1994 the Bashkir government have been working a project called
"The Ethnoses of Bashkortostan". In this project the Bashkir authorities
attempt to resolve national problem of Bashkortostan by giving equal status
to all major nationalities of the republics. However, national equality
has not been achieved , and the Tatars, the second largest nationality of
the Bashkir republic, still suffer national discrimination.
In addition to its ethnic problems, Bashkortostan suffers from serious
ecological problems. During the Soviet years the Bashkir population
suffered several times medically and genetically the consequences of
repeated atomic explosions in the region. In the 1990’s the citizens of Ufa
underwent mass-poisoning caused by the leakage of phenol to the city water
system.
The political leadership of the Bashkir republic is in its nature and
composition similar to that of Tatarstan. There is Baskir-dominated
parliament composed of the ex-communists. On 12 January 1992 Murtaza
Rahimov, a former refinery director and chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
was elected president.
Unlike his counterpart in Tatarstan, president Rahimiov adopted a liberal
policy towards the Bashkir national opposition parties. It can be even said
that there is substantial solidarity on some matters between the Bashkir
government and opposition parties. The Bashkir authorities jealously guard
the existence of a distinct Bashkir nation, because without the presence
of the Bashkir nation, there would be no Bashkir republic. For the
authorities, the preservation of the Bashkir nation is a matter of dignity,
otherwise they would obliged to recognize that Bashkirs as well as
"their" lands as a historical part of the Tatar nation.
-continued- with Northern Caucasus
************************************************
Mehmet Tutuncu
(SOTA) Research centre for Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Caucasus and Siberia
P.o. box 9642
2003 LP Haarlem
The Netherlands
e-mail: <mtutuncu@turkiye.net> or <sota@euronet.nl>
Turkish World Home Page:<http://www.turkiye.net/sota/sota.html>
Crimean Tatars Home-Page: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html>
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