<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>------------<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>.....TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER...ISSN:--1386-6265....<<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>--------------------------------------------<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>........Editor/Manager: Mehmet Tutuncu......<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>......Business:S.Bogut,H.Savas..............<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>...Features: I. Noyan-Izmirli,Y. Puersuen...<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>>......Technical: T. Ates, K. Cagiltay.......<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>>......Associate Editors: A.Baguirov, A. Eren,Z.Kadir....<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>....Editorial Board:Dr.Robert M.Cutler, Dr.H.M.Hubey....<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>........Dr.T.Kocaoglu, Dr.N.Sariahmetoglu...............<<>><<>>
<<>><<>>--------------------------------------------------------<<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>><<>>.....Volume:97-1:14a--23--june--1997....<<>><<>><<>><<>>
<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>-----------------------------<<><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>
<>Uze kok tengri asra yagiz yer kilintukta ekin ara kisi ogli kilinmis<>
<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>------------<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>
************************************************************************
********Archives of the Turkistan Newsletter can be found at:***********
********<http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.htm>****************
************************************************************************
Special Issue 14a
1. Visit of Heydar Aliev to Tashkent -- Turan News Agency Analysis
2. Turkey's Foreign Policy -- Dr. Mehmet Tutuncu, SOTA-Turkistan-newsletter
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
T U R A N NEWS AGENCY -----INFORMASIYA AGENTLIYI
370000, BAKU, Khagani st., 33. Fax. 98-38-17, âl. 98-42-26,
98-40-27,telex 142168 TIA AI,E-mail:root@turan.azerbaijan.su
20.06.97
ANALYTICAL REVIEW BY TURAN --- ISSUE - 341
VISIT OF HEYDAR ALIYEV TO TASHKENT
May 27-28, 1996 , for the first time in the new history of
post-soviet countries the visit of the president of Uzbekistan
I. Karimov to Azerbaijan took place. This event was positively accepted by
politicians and analysts. This visit lifted "alienation" in the relations
between the two people. The Azeri-Uzbekistani partnership was dictated by
their will to independence and the will to develop new regional
integration relations. In their strategic ambitions favourable influence
on this rapprochement was made by domination of pro-western orientations.
The west is very interested in these two countries and they gradually
become involved under its geopolitical "umbrella". Then Karimov said firmly:
the Azeri-Uzbek partnership should be stimulated first of all by the
pragmatic considerations. And both presidents emphasised the
importance of the TRASECA project - the main factor in increase of
regional cooperation between the countries of the region. In the whole, the
visit of I. Karimov lifted many contradictions and created basis for the
further rapprochement of the positions on key directions of strategic
development.
Present visit of Heydar Aliyev to Tashkent is not the only
natural procedure course for diplomacy - some kind of return visit. The
president of Azerbaijan realised official invitation by Karimov made
last year in Baku.
It is known that the relations between the two countries can progress in
many points on the basis of often contacts of the heads of the states and
ratification of new trends of cooperation. 19 documents were signed in
Tashkent on June 18, all of them are directly connected with
intensification of bilateral integration. Besides, the presidents signed
three documents: Declaration on further development of all-round
cooperation and partnership; Treaty on legal assistance andlegal
relations on civic, family and criminal issues, as well as the Protocol on
creation of joint intergovernmental commission for bilateral cooperation.
At the briefing Islam Karimov told that Tashkent considers Baku as
reliable partner in trade-economic relations. The presidents confirmed
their intention to co-ordinate efforts on construction of objects of
transnational character: pipelines, rail ways, etc.
Concerning the Armenian-Azeri conflict Karimov said: "We think there
cannot be two Armenian states in the Caucasus and we support peaceful
resolution of this conflict." He is sure that the OSCE Minsk group
reinforced by the U.S. - is "a good impulse for the process of
resolution." "I am sure that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan need the
Karabakh conflict. Someone tries to keep this hot bed for their strategic
interests," Karimov said.
Geopolitical situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia is changing very
quickly. Any slightest local event can bring about new non-predictable
geopolitical consequences. Whereas, significant events took place in the
region. We will note only some of them: sharp change of the situation in
Afghanistan, change of the power in Iran, governmental crisis in Turkey,
innovations and dynamism of uncertainty of political situation in Russia
(both in the country and in the context of perspectives of the union with
Belorussia) and others. All these processes touch on the interests of
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. It is clear that periodically there is demand
of bilateral contacts for the purpose to work out optimal behaviour in
extreme situation. It was confirmed by the negotiations which took place.
He stressed that there is full mutual understanding with Heydar Aliyev in
the questions of further development of the CIS, situation in the Caucasus
and Central Asia. The presidents told they are not going to join the union
of Russia and Belorussia.
One should not ignore the fact that most motives of the political
behaviour of Heydar Aliyev are determined by the scenario of preparation
to the coming negotiations with the president Clinton. In this plan the
visit to Tashkent should not be excluded. It is not a secret that Russia
is losing its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia: geopolitical
situation in the south of post-soviet countries more and more is directed
towards Washington. Quite recently the US tried to conceal their plans
concerning perspectives in this region, but now they openly declare that
the Caucasus and Central Asia are in the sphere of their strategic
interests. Baku accepts that with optimism. Active integration of the US
to the region may create ground for the resolution of key problems of the
country (such as the Armenian-Azeri conflict, implementation of oil
contracts, investments to the economy and so on.) Probably, by these
visits Heydar Aliyev is preparing for Clinton some kind of regional
"geopolitical carpet"- readiness of most of the countries of the region
to strategic partnership with the US.
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Caucasus
drs. Mehmet Tutuncu
1. Introduction
Turkey lies as a bridge between East and West, North and South,
Christendom and Islam. It has a big history and as a consequence
of this many enemies but also many well-meaning-countries and
peoples in its neighbourhood. It has the potential to influence
countries a thousand miles away, from China and Indonesia to
Western Europe. This influence is due to the great history of
Turkish Ottoman empire.
This country has potential to grow as a regional power. It
was one of the few countries which would be most affected by the
demise of Soviet Union. With its more than 60 million people,
its experience of market economics, and as the heir of the Ottoman
Empire, the independence of five republics inhabited by people of
Turkic origin (one in Caucasus and four in Central asia) opened
for Turkey hopeful opportunities to become a regional power.
These policies were encouraged through European Union's reluctance
to accept Turkey as a full member. Turkey had hoped to become a
regional power so that Europe could not deny her membership in EU.
But after 5 years of independence this forecast has not been borne out.
Turkey is not a leading active factor in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, as it was forecast. What are the resaons for that,
and what was the actual Turkish foreign policy during the first
years of dissolution of Soviet Union? These are the points which
will be discussed in this contribution.
2. Republican policy towards foreign Turks (1920-1990)
Turkey's foreign policy after the death of Kemal Ataturk can be
characterised with a slogan of Ataturk: "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda
Sulh", "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad (in the World) ". Ataturk
spoke these words to maintain peace inside the borders of a country
which was tired of centuries long wars. After the dissolution of
Ottoman empire Republic of Turkey needed the time and means to
restore itself.
So Turkey, from 1923 to 1990 (nearly seven decades) was an inward-
looking country, with no apparent interest in foreign
(related) Turkic populations. Turkey remained neutral during the
World War II.
After this war, Stalin's Soviet Union threatened Turkey seriously;
Stalin wanted back some Eastern povinces (which Russia had lost
after WWI), and he also wanted the Straits of Bosporus and the
Dardanelles (Russias main trade ways through Black Sea) to
be ruled through Turkey and Soviet Union. Turkey, afraid of these
threats became in 1952 member of NATO. After this Turkey's foreign
policy was followed NATO's policy.
Turkey was not involved in any independent policy towards the Soviet
Turks. Under NATO's umbrella Turkey was safe and turned to the
West. The East was forgotten. That in Soviet Union lived
relatives of Turkish origins which outnumbered the Turks from
Turkey did not affect Turkey's foreign affairs policy makers. The
Outside Turks was a matter only for some emigre organizations of
Azerbaijani, North Caucasus and Turkistan refugees which were
settled in Turkey.
3. After 1990
So one can say Turkey was one of the countries which would be
most affected through dissolution of the Soviet Union, but it was
also one of the countries which was not prepared to such moves.
On 30 August 1991 Azerbaijan declared independence, and asked
foreign countries to recognize its independence. Turkey was
inexperienced on how to handle such affairs.
One day later on 31st of August Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
declared their independence, and Turkmenistan followed on 27st of
October. Kazakstan* was the last of former soviet countries which
declared independence on 16 of December 1991. Turkey was hesitant
in the beginning to recognize these moves.
On 3 september 1991 Turkey recognized, following the Western
countries, the independence of Baltic countries of Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia. Azerbaijan was not recognized until 9
November 1991. This delay in recognizing of Turkeys most close
kin-country can only be explained by Turkey's careful policy not
to stir Moscow.
When it became clear that Soviet Union was over Turkey recognized,
on 15th of December, all the republics. But it still said its
diplomatic relations would be established via the embassy in
Moscow, and and that consulates would be opened in the independent
republics. But on 30 December 1991 Turkey changed its decision and
the consulates were upgraded to embassy-level.
Although Turkey was hesitant in recognizing them, it was the first
country which recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. And it
was also the first country which recognized the other republics.
After their independence it established close ties with Turkic
republics.
Some of these initiatives:
- It made efforts to made these countries member of ECO
(Economic Cooperation Organization), whose members then
were Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
- In 1992 the presidents of Turkic Republics were invited to the World
Economic Forum in Davos on the initiative and at cost to Turkey.
- In 1992 Turkey organized a Turkic summit in Ankara. At this
summit 5 presidents were present. This was on the
occasion of the 70th year of declaration of Republic of Turkey.
Turkey wanted also to form some formal structure of Turkic
countries but this were rejected by Kazakstan and
Uzbekistan. So this summit remains an informal summit of
Turkic republics.
- Turkey opened a television channel TRT AVrasya.
- It committed itself to give opportunity to 10,000 students of
these republics to study in Turkey.
- It opened credits to improve economic activities in these
republics.
As far as other neighbouring countries is concerned Turkey
inititiated Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization.
4. Caucasus
For Turkey's relations with Russia policy the Caucasus plays a key
role. This sensitive area was for centuries scene of Turco-
Russian Wars. So for relations between Turkey and Central Asia
and Russia the Caucasus region constitutes a passage way and plays
the role of a bridge. In this relationship from the beginning on
Azerbaijan was seen as Turkey's natural ally. Azeris are closely related
to Turkey Turks and speak the same language. So Turkey declared in
1990 not to act against Azerbaijan's interests in the region.
Azerbaijan was a strategic country for Turkey. This relationship
is tested by Nagorno-Karabagh. In the beginning Turkey wanted
to build a special relationship with Azerbaijan. But its policy
was undermined by Moscow-based coup attempts.
But Turkey did not manage to hold a Turkey-friendly regime of
Elchibey in power. With the ousting of Elchibey Turkey lost the
hopes of being an active actor in the Caucasus.
4.1. Azerbaijan
For obvious geographical reasons, Azerbaijan forms the principal
link between Turkey and Central Asia. Together with the Crimea,
it had been the cradle of the Pan-Turkism which emerged among
Turkic intellectuals at the beginning of 20th century. These
people had developed a concept of linguistic and cultural unity
in order to protect themselves against a tide of Russification
under tsarist rule. This idea spread to their neighbours in the
dying Ottoman Empire and was revived briefly in Turkey after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991, it seemed for a while as
if old dreams could come true.
As soon as Azerbaijan became independent, in 1991, the
leaders of that republic established close relations with Turkey
in order to receive technical and cultural assistance and to
counterbalance the Russian influence. Relations between
Azerbaijan and Turkey became even more intense after the 1992
election victory of Abulfaz Elchibey, the Popular Front
candidate. Elchibey promised that the country of his beloved idol
Ataturk would participate fully in the exploitation of
Azerbaijani oil wealth - for which Turkey had already fought
after the first world war.
In 1992 it seemed that Turkey gained a very important leverage above
Moscow. A person who saw Turkey as its own country and whose
admiration for Ataturk was so clear that he declared himself as
a soldier of Ataturk was elected President. Paradoxically President
Elchibey whose pro-Turkey policies stirred Iran and Soviets did not
gain much support from Turkey. Turkey supported Elchibey
only by words, e.g. it gave for Nakhichevan where old KGB Boss
and Polit-bureau member Aliev had became president much more
financial credits than to the Elchibey lead Baku-government.
This policy could be counted on Turkeys careful policies not to
stir Moscow.
Elchibey was president for only one year; through a rebellion
which was registered through Moscow-backed forces he fled to
Nakhichevan. This move of Elchibey is criticized heavily, but I
think he did the right thing. The alternative was Tbilisi
scenario which its heavy costs and internal war. This could lead
to disintegration of Azerbaijan and definitely the loss of Karabag.
So Elchibey asked for help form Turkey, but instead Turkish
government advised him to work closer with Heidar Aliev. So for
Elchibey the only alternative was to go away or start a fraternal war
between factions in Baku.
With Elchibey Turkey lost its role as a primary player of the
Caucasus game. This decision of Turkey is mostly criticized
internally. But the reasons are not clear yet. But I think that it
was Turkey's internal struggle of power was debit to this
mistakes. President Ozal was just dead when he returned form a
visit from Baku, and Turkey was involved in voting for a new
president and a minister president which were inexperienced
government had come to rule.
But Turkey did not manage to hold the Turkey-friendly regime of
Elchibey in power. With the ousting of Elchibey Turkey lost the
hopes of being an active actor in the Caucasus, so it ended
up as a bystander in the ensuing events. In particular, it failed
to play a leading role in the Armenian-Azeri conflict.
An initial outcome of the demise of the Soviet Union has been to
transform the Karabagh issue from a domestic to an international
dispute. Relaxation of the Russian hold, at least for a time, has
driven Russia's traditional opponents, Iran and Turkey, into this
inter-ethnic conflict. Gorbachev's approach was to condemn
nationalist and separatist aspirations while giving virtual carte
blanche to successive Azeri leaderships to keep the lid on the
problem, with assistance from Soviet troops as and when needed.
Armenia was one of the first republics, after the Baltics, to
declare its firm intention of independence from the Union. This
was something of an irony because Armenia, at least for two
centuries had looked up to Russia as its protector. Unlike
Azerbaijan, Armenia refused to participate in the all Union
Referendum held on March 17,1991. This was based on the Armenian
conviction that the new Union Treaty would enshrine Azerbaijan's
right to Karabagh. As a response to the perceived Armenian
betrayal, Russia chose to side with Azerbaijan, at least
covertly. On September 23, 1991, Armenia declared independence.
However, mere independence did not annihilate Armenia's
obligation to sign the treaty that formed the ClS, in December
1991 in Almaty. Meanwhile, the new Armenian leadership under
Levon Ter - Petrosyan came to recognize that it really had Little
alternative to normalizing relations with Turkey. In April 1991,
the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow made a visit to Armenia. Drafts
of a treaty of friendship were prepared, together with an
agreement to initiate direct cross-border trade and the opening
of a highway between the two countries.
As the demise of the Soviet Union transformed the Karabagh
conflict from a domestic dispute into an international political
issue, it also underlined the extreme fluidity of the
neo-politics of the region. Initially, Turkey and Iran were
engaged in a controlled rivalry for influence in Baku, while
Russia was dealing with internal problems emanating from
disintegration. Iran had the obvious geographic advantage of
continuous borders with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, offering it
more strategic options than Turkey. In late 1991, a crossborder
bridge was constructed between Turkey and Nakhichevan and was
opened on 31 October, 1991. The Iranian vulnerability is that
the Iranian Azeris constitute 25% of the country's population.
Iran also happens to have a sizable Armenian minority. Iranian
good offices thus have greater credibility with Armenia.
Tehran's dilemma has been to decide how far it can go
sympathizing with Armenia before it loses leverage in Baku.
Should Tehran find Baku contemplative of the separation of
Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran, as it appeared for a time under the
Elchibey government, it could lend support to Armenia in the
Karabagh crisis thus placing itself on a collision course with
Turkey. Since Turkey's prompt recognition of Baku's declaration
of independence in November 1991, Iran came to believe that
Turkey was working to increase Turkic consciousness in the
region. Moscow's initial vacillation between support for Armenia
and doing nothing gradually undermined Russia's position in the
region. Russia seemed to anxiously await Iranian failure at
mediation, promoting its own conflict resolution strategy
activating the CSCE mechanism and providing parallel unilateral
mediation. The collapse of the Azeri defenses in Karabagh was in
no small measure due to Russian arms and equipment and the
apparent participation of certain Russian army and military
units. In February 1992, Russia took the initiative of holding
talks in Moscow between Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and his
Armenian and Azeri counterparts. Iran for its part, brokered two
cease-fires in late February and early May 1992, both of which
were violated before the ink had dried. In May 1992, during
negotiations chaired by Iranian President Rafsanjani in Tehran,
Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan and the interim President of
Azerbaijan reached agreement on a stage-by-stage resolution of
the conflict. Iran's active mediation was viewed with some
suspicion in Moscow, prompting Russian leadership to insist in
sending representatives to any further negotiations on Karabagh
that might be held in Tehran in the future. Turkey, on the other
hand, was constrained by the difficulty of balancing the desire
to promote its own version of secularism and capitalism in
Azerbaijan against the risk of incurring Western censure for
supporting Azerbaijani forces in the Karabagh dispute. It was
these considerations that led to the Turkish rejection of a
proposed defense pact by Azerbaijan that would have obliged
Turkey to guarantee Azerbaijan's security. The rejection gave
rise to intensified demands from the Turkish public at large for
more active interventionism on Turkey's part, especially after
Khojhali massacre in late February 1992. When Armenian troops
launched an attack from hills overlooking the city of Sadarak in
Nakhichevan in May 1992, Turkish Foreign Ministry declaration of
censure was based on the third article of the Treaty of Kars,
according to which Turkey and Russia were to guarantee the
autonomy of Nakhichevan. However, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel
ruled out the use of force in Nakhichevan, arguing that Turkish
involvement would lead to a wider conflict between Christians and
Muslims in the region.
In the Azerbaijani presidential elections held on 7 June 1992,
the Popular Front leader Ebulfeyz Elchibey received over 60% of
the votes. The result could be said to have effectively precluded
further initiatives over Baku by both Russia and Iran. Elchibey
championed close ties with Turkey as well as the urgent adoption
of the Latin alphabet. Sensing the prospect of- cultural pull,
Iranian discomfort was evident. Elchibey also unsettled Moscow.
In May 1992, while he was still a presidential candidate, he
asserted that Azerbaijan would not be a part of the CIS and that
all agreements signed by former president Muttalibov were invalid
because they had not been ratified by the Parliament. In October
1992, the Azerbaijani National Assembly voted unanimously against
Azerbaijan's membership in the CIS. On June 4, 1993, Azerbaijani
government troops launched a surprise attack on the Gandjha
headquarters commanded by Colonel Suret Huseinov. Formerly in
charge of the Azerbaijani forces in Karabagh, Huseinov had been
demoted from the position in February 1993 amid rumors that he
was planning a coup. The incident served as a catalyst,
precipitating a full scale revolt by Huseinov - Within a month,
President Elchibey fled from Baku, stripped of- all his powers-
Gaidar Aliev was named acting President, and Huseinov was
appointed Prime Minister. The new configuration of power in Baku
would have far-reaching implications for Azerbaijan's future
relations with Turkey, Russia, and Iran. Elchibey's foreign
policy was oriented in the first instance toward Turkey. His
flight from Baku elicited official Turkish statements of support
for him as the democratically elected president. Later, however,
after the National Assembly had voted to transfer Elchibey's
powers to Aliev, Turkey adopted the position that this was a
legitimate decision taken in accordance with the Azerbaijani
constitution. Gaidar Aliev muted his predecessor's openly
pro-Turkish orientation in favor of mending closer ties with
Russia and Iran. Russia's priority was to bring Azerbaijan back
into its sphere of influence to demonstrate again that it was the
one most qualified to mediate inter-ethnic conflicts between
former Soviet republics. Aliev for his part, must have been
acutely aware that his chances of political survival depended
overwhelmingly on achieving some kind of settlement of the
Karabagh conflict, which had precipitated the ouster of his
immediate predecessors. The Azeri-Russian rapprochement provided
the basis for a security agreement culminating in the return of
Azerbaijan, in September 27, 1993, to the fold, accepting to
become a full-fledged member of the C.I.S.
In January 1994, a rapprochement between Iran and Russia came to
view. Yeltsin's envoy Vladimir Kazimirov traveled to Tehran upon
the invitation of the Iranian government. They reached agreement
on the terms of a joint initiative to end the fighting in
Karabagh. Although the peace plan was later rejected by Baku, the
fact that Ankara was not invited to the negotiations raised
question marks. On 8 February 1994, Aliev embarked on a four-day
official visit to Turkey that appeared to have marked a
qualitatively new phase in Turkish Azerbaijani relations. Terms
of the signed agreements signaled Aliev's intention to
re-establish close ties with Turkey and, at the same time, not
to endanger the balance he has been trying to strike in the
region between Russia, Iran and Turkey. At the beginning of 1994,
in Ashkabad, leaders of the former Soviet republics looked much
the same as vassals paying tribute to a feudal lord. Eduard
Shevardnadze, leader of the war-ravaged Georgia, accepted the
rules of the game established by the Russians, in return for
Moscow's help in quelling Georgia's civil strife. Azerbaijan also
gradually veered into Moscow's orbit because of economic,
political and military hardships.
5.2 Armenia
For many centuries until national consciousness became a
force in the 18th and 19th century ethnic and religious tolerance
was characteristic of the Ottoman Empire. The Christian Armenians
and Muslim Turks lived brotherly together until the end of 19th.
century. The Armenians were called Millet-i Sadyka (the loyal
people). As the structure of the Ottoman Empire crumbled and new
power centers arose in Europe, the destruction of the empire led
different religious groups to seek separation from the mainstream
Moslem majority. Armenians in this respect found Russians to be
good allies and supporters since the latter had objectives that
encompassed Ottoman territories. Therefore, in many wars fought
in the 19th and 20th Century Armenians found themselves fighting
against the Turks, and for that matter against the Iranians, that has
proven to be very costly for them. In fact, their taking side
with the Russians during the First World War, led to the
deportation of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia.
Again their action after the evacuation of Russian troops from
Eastern Turkey in 1917 led to Turkish counter action. Under the
Treaty of Gumru 1920 which was later modified and confirmed by
the Turkish-Russian Treaty of 1921, the present borders of
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were determined and Turkey and
Russia put Nakhchevan under the protection of Azerbaijan as an
autonomous region.
Armenia has no common borders with Russia, its historical ally,
but it borders two other players in Caucasus. Its longest
border is with Azerbaijan (in the East 566 km, in the south
(Nahichevan) 221km), with Turkey 268 km, with Georgia 164 km, it
borders also to Iran only 35 km. It has a population of 3.5
million, predominantly Armenian. Most ethnic Azeris were cleansed
before and after the war over Nagorno-Karabagh. A land-locked
country, Armenia is dependent on outside connections for trade and
energy except some from Iran and Georgia. While it has
significant mineral deposits Armenia cannot be considered as rich
in natural resources. For energy Armenia relies on Gas from
Russia and Azerbaijan (closed since conflict over Karabagh) and
Nuclear Energy.
The nuclear power plant which is of the type of Chernobyl
presents a great risk for the entire region. Unless, the war with
Azerbaijan ends Armenia has very little possibility for importing
energy. One important factor that helps Armenian economy is the
contribution of the Diaspora in the United States, France and
other countries.
Two principal parties dominate Armenian political scene. They are
the Armenian National Movement and the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (the Dashnaktsutiun). The ARF has been banned since 1995
by the government.
ANM is headed by President Ter Petrossian who favors burying the
past and establishing good relations with Turkey, and seems
inclined to encourage a peaceful settlement and compromise on the
Karabagh issue with Azerbaijan. In the domestic scene AMN favours
rapid economic reform and full privatization. The origin of the
Dashnak party goes back to the 19th Century and they are extreme
nationalists and are in favour of vengeance on Turkey. They
seem to have greater support among the Diaspora, rather than in
Armenia, and there are good reasons to assume that they were
behind ASALA terrorist organization which waged an assassination
campaign against Turkish diplomats during 1970s and 1980s. The
banning of this party from political activities in Armenia has
been considered a favourable gesture in Turkey. After the
devastating earthquake of 1988, Armenia suffered a serious
economic decline. This was aggravated by the embargo imposed by
Azerbaijan after the beginning of the war, and Turkey's
unwillingness to establish official diplomatic relations and
extend economic assistance, until a peace settlement is in sight.
Armenia, like Georgia relies heavily on outside economic
assistance for which total exact figures are not available. For
energy Armenia's dependence on Russia continues and two Russian
divisions guard Armenian borders mainly with Turkey.
In the initial years after the independence there was a euphoria
both among the people of Armenia and among the Diaspora that
Armenia could become an extension of the West in the
Caucasus and enjoy outside assistance similar to those received
by Israel in the Middle East. Initially, imported Diaspora
members such as Rafi Hovanissian, who became the first Foreign
Minister of Armenia followed an aggressive diplomacy against
Armenia's neighbours, mainly Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, this
was a short-lived feeling that did not correspond to realities
of Armenia.
Like other Caucasus countries Armenia too had to follow a policy
of good relations and balancing act among three principle outside
actors, namely Turkey, Russia and Iran. For reasons that are part
and parcel of Armenian ethos improvement of relations with Turkey
seemed to be difficult although highly desirable. In the early
years after the Second World War, Etchmiazin, the Seat of the
Armenian Church was bent on using its presence and influence in
the Kremlin to obtain some territory from Turkey. During that
period Armenian Diaspora in the United States was friendly to
Turkey. In the beginning of 1954, during the visit of the Turkish
President to the United States, entire public relations
activities for him in California was conducted by the Armenian
Diaspora.
After the initial days of Armenian independence the Diaspora still
continued to lobby the US congress for anti-Turkish resolutions
while the administration in Armenia sought seeking improved relations
with Turkey. This paradox which still continues in the US will
eventually disappear, after the settlement of the Karabagh issue
and evacuation of occupied Azeri territories, that will create
conditions for Turkish help and assistance to Armenia.
Although Turkey recognized Armenia with other successor states
of the Soviet Union , it declined to establish diplomatic ties
due to occupation of Azerbaijani territories and conflict of
Karabakh.
Armenia has asked Turkey to separate Erivan-Ankara relations from
the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian President Levon Ter
Petrosian's chief adviser Jirair Liberdian, who was in Ankara
begin of september 1996, pointed out that Turkey and Greece had
trade, diplomatic, and touristic ties despite the disputes
between the two countries over the Cyprus issue. Armenia, he
said, would like to establish the same sort of relations with
Turkey.
Turkey refused (just like Azerbaijan) to separate between the
Armenian government and the leadership of the self-proclaimed
Republic of Karabakh. So there are some overtures and gestures
between Turkey and Armenia, but Turkish policy on Armenia is
dependent on the solution of conflict in Karabakh.
5.3 Georgia
Turkey's initial stress on Central Asia and Azerbaijan, combined
with internal struggle in Georgia, reduced Georgia's importance
for Turkish foreign-policy in 1992-1993. Turkey recognized
Georgia (with all the other Soviet Republics) in November 1991
but established diplomatic ties, much later. During the Abkhazian-
Georgian War Turkey did not choose any party, Government stressed
many times that this conflict should be treated within the
territorial integrity of Georgia, but Turkish public opinion
sided with Abkhazians thanks to the big North-Caucasian Diaspora.
Vladislav Ardzinba President of Abkhazia visited Turkey many times
during 1992-1993. He was not received by any Turkish
official but many Caucasian diaspora organizations supported him.
Abkhazians won this little war, and Georgia lost control of
Abkhazia. After return of Shevardnadze and Georgia's decision to
enter CIS Turkey saw its flaws and established closer ties with
Georgia. Georgia is very important for Turkey because, due to
Turkish-Armenians deadlock of borders Georgia is the only country
through which Turkish transport-trucks can go,and also because Georgian
route is the alternative of building a pipeline for Caspian oil to
Turkey and mediterranean.
6. Future implications
In the near future the expectation is that Turco-Georgian
relations will improve, because there are no potential factors
which can disturb these relations. Georgia is dependent on Turkey
for its economic improvement, and Turkey is dependent of Georgia
for its land-ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. So If Turkish-
Georgia relations improve and oil-pipelines, railways, highways
and other infrastructural projects are ready which link Turkey to
Azerbaijan and Central Asia than the economic upheaval could bypass Armenia.
Armenia could become a big loser in the region despite its
successes gaining control of Karabakh and 20% of Azerbaijani
lands. Armenia is poor in minerals and is land-locked without
any ability to have access to sea-ports. Armenia's economic
possibilities are very restricted. So if Armenia will not improve
its relations with Turkey it shall lose the pipelines and its
economic gains and may become a backward country of the region.
7. Conclusions
Five years have passed since the demise of the Soviet Union, and
many of the Turkish expectations have not materialized. Turkey's
aspirations to a regional leadership role in Turkic World have
been undermined by Turkeys own limitations.
Turkey has been confronted by serious obstacles in extending its
sphere of influence. These were mainly internal problems
(economic crisis, Kurdish separatism) but also the Russian policy
of restricting Turkey's influence.
It is cut off from the new Turkish world, except for a few miles
of common border - with the Azerbaijan enclave Nakhchevan.
Armenia is behaving as a Russian protectorate,and Azerbaijan's
pro-Turkish president Elchibey has been waved away for the pro-
russian Aliyev. And Turkey did not manage to hold the government
of Elchibey.
One can say Turkey began good, but after a while Turkey's
economy began to move to an another crisis. And it became
obvious that Turkey had promised more than it can afford to deliver.
It was expected that Turkey would function as a bridge between
the Turkic republics and Western countries. Turkey's new
mission would be a pro-Western, secular, democratic and free market
model and anchor for 5 Turkic Republics into the Western world.
Being an opponent for Iran's influence of islamism and
fundamentalism, was also Turkey's role. As a (semi-) developed
and populous country Turkey had a strong industrial base.
But Turkeys complete indifference in the former decades about
Soviet Turks eventually showed its effects.
This complete indifference of Turkic heritage in Soviet Union
became very evident when new republics were established. The
unexpected independence of 5 Turkic republics was for Turkey a
task it was not prepared for. In the beginning Turkey
did not have any expertise or research institutes of Soviet or
Turkic affairs. This lack of information was so urgent that when
Turkish president Ozal visited the United States in 1989 and when US
journalists asked him questions about ongoing conflict in
Upper Karabakh, the inexperienced Ozal said that the Azeris are Shi'a
and that they are closer to Iran than to Turkey. This answer is
a good exampleif the lack of information of Turkish government
concerning outside Turkic peoples.
What Turkey could, and did was expansion of cultural ties.
But when Turkey became aware of the independecce -reality of
Turkic Republics it then reacted too enthusiastically. It
promised too many things it could not do. The Turkic Republics
wantedinvestments and financial aid from Turkey. Turkish
government was not able to provide aid that was promised.
The unstable internal policy of coalitions and the ongoing war
against Kurdish PKK, had laid too many claims on Turkish financial
potential.
Notes:
------------------------------------------------------------------
* The word "Cossack" is from the Turkic root "kaz/gaz" and has
to do with "wandering". The /kh/ in Kazakh was added purposely so that
Kazak could not be confused with "cossack", but the real pronunciation
is more like /qazaq/ where the /q/ is a back-k, and hence there is
no reason to refer to "kazaks" in the manner of Russian-speakers.
The country's name is Kazakstan, and the people are Kazaks.
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Mark Hubey ---------------------------------------------------------
http://www.csam.montclair.edu/Faculty/Hubey.html
hubey@pegasus.montclair.edu hubeyh@alpha.montclair.edu
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
TURKISTAN-N is an electronic newsletter whose purpose is to report on the
"Land of the Turks". With Turkistan we mean in general lands where Turkic
peoples live without any geographical restriction and without specific
reference to Central Asia or political boundaries.
If you want to have information about all the the Turkic peoples from
Kirgiz, Kazaks, Uzbek but also about less known Turkish/Turkic peoples like
the Gagauz, Tuvinians or Shors Turkistan-N is a medium for this.
Turkistan-N was established on 9 May 1997 as an inititiative of SOTA.
Beside news book reviews, commentaries, articles, and letters from the
readers can also be published in TN.
*
* Turkistan-N has at this moment more than 750 subscribers.
*
* To subscribe: send a message to <majordomo@turkistan.org> with
* subscribe Turkistan-N
*
* To unsubscribe: send a message to <majordomo@turkistan.org> with
* unsubscribe Turkistan-N
*
* Send your questions and contributions to : <owner-turkistan-N@turkistan.org>
*
*
* (C) You can post and distribute the items of Turkistan-N with giving credit
* and reference to Turkistan-N and SOTA.
*
* (SOTA) Research centre for Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Caucasus
* and Siberia
* P.o. box 9642
* 2003 LP Haarlem
* The Netherlands
* e-mail: <mtutuncu@turkiye.net> or <sota@euronet.nl>
* Turkish World Home :<http://www.turkiye.net/sota/sota.html>
* Crimean Tatars Home: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html>
* Turkistan-N Archives: <http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.htm>
<<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>>